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Judge Florence Allen, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (1938)
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FIRST WOMAN JUDGE,
FLORENCE ALLEN: CHALLENGING THE MYTH OF
WOMEN JUDGING DIFFERENTLY
TRACY A. THOMAS*
I. EARLY INFLUENCES:PROGRESSIVE FAMILY AND FEMALE FRIENDS
A. Family, Service, and Community
B. Finding Feminist Friends
II. ADVOCATING FOR WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE
III. AN INDEPENDENT, TOUGH JUDGE ON THE TRIAL COURT
IV. MODERATION ON THE OHIO SUPREME COURT
V. A CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL ON THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT
VI. SHORTLISTED
CONCLUSION: THE GAVEL’S GLASS CEILING
Judge Florence Allen is often called the “first” woman judge.1
She was the first woman elected to a general trial court in 1920 on
the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas in Cleveland, Ohio.2 She was
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1. See JEANETTE E. TUVE, FIRST LADY OF THE LAW: FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN v
(1984).
2. Id. at 53–54, 56; Florence Ellinwood Allen, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & THE
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the first woman elected to a state Supreme Court, elected to the Ohio
Supreme Court in 1922 and re-elected in 1928.3 She was the first
woman appointed to a federal appellate court, nominated to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1934 by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt.4 She was the first woman to serve as chief judge of a
federal appellate court, taking leadership of the Sixth Circuit in 1958.5
And, she was the first woman shortlisted for the U.S. Supreme
Court, nominated for more than ten vacancies by four presidents
from both parties.6
Florence Allen was a woman who broke gender barriers at every
level of the judiciary during her forty years on the bench. This legacy
is memorialized in the nation’s first Social Justice Park, established
in Columbus, Ohio, a mile from the Ohio Judicial Center where Allen
served for more than a decade on the Ohio Supreme Court.7 The
Social Justice Park also highlights Allen’s pivotal role as an advocate
for women’s suffrage, a legacy that launched her into law and poli-
tics, and ultimately to the judiciary. Allen first joined the national
woman’s suffrage movement in New York City during law school at
New York University.8 She became the key legal leader for the
women’s suffrage movement in Ohio, shepherding cases and chal-
lenging restrictions on women’s right to vote.9 In the first election
in which women had the right to vote after ratification of the Nine-
teenth Amendment in August 1920, Florence Allen became the first
woman elected as judge, running as an independent but actively
OHIO JUDICIAL SYSTEM, https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bios/al
len.asp [https://perma.cc/EJ9E-33LR].
3. TUVE, supra note 1, at 66–67, 86–87.
4. Id. at v; Florence E. Allen Named Federal Judge: First Woman to Get Place on Cir-
cuit Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1934, at 9. The first woman jurist appointed to any federal
court was Genevieve Cline, chair of the Ohio Republican Women, appointed to the United
States Customs Court in New York City by President Calvin Coolidge in 1928. TUVE, supra
note 1, at 88.
5. TUVE, supra note 1, at 189.
6. RENEE KNAKE JEFFERSON & HANNAH BRENNER JOHNSON, SHORTLISTED: WOMEN
IN THE SHADOWS OF THE SUPREME COURT 16 (2020); Beverly B. Cook, The First Woman
Candidate for the Supreme Court—Florence Allen, in YEARBOOK 1981: SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY 19 (1981).
7. Danae King, Mural at New Park Honors Columbus’ Social-Justice Pioneers, CO-
LUMBUS DISPATCH (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20181028/mural-at-new
-park-honors-columbus-social-justice-pioneers [https://perma.cc/4R6W-B4SX]; see WASHING-
TONGLADDENSOCIALJUSTICEPARK, https://www.socialjusticepark.org [https://perma.cc
/5LLP-PNWE]. Judge Allen spoke on this site of the historical Congregational Church
made famous by community leader Rev. Washington Gladden immediately after her elec-
tion to the Ohio Supreme Court in 1922. FLORENCE E. ALLEN, TO DO JUSTLY 74 (1965).
8. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 31.
9. N.R. Howard, Miss Allen Talks of Women’s Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1934, at
XX2.
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supported by both Republican and Democratic women at the local
and national level.10 Allen credited “the great woman movement”
and the “sisterhood” for her success and judicial appointments: “the
place didn’t come to me,” she said, “you gave it to me.”11 The biparti-
san amalgamation of suffrage women and their organizational
networks would continue to lobby for Allen, securing her nomination
to the federal appellate court, and endlessly campaigning for her
nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court.12
Despite her importance as a key figure in legal history, little is
known about Judge Allen’s life and jurisprudence. The sole biogra-
phy of her life is out of print, Allen’s memoir is encased in glass in
the Ohio Supreme Court library, and neither is readily available for
purchase.13 It is difficult to typecast Judge Allen into a category of
politics or jurisprudence. She described herself as a “liberal conserva-
tive,” capturing her progressive ideals but moderate inclinations.14
Allen is best known for her state decisions upholding municipal power,
and her federal decisions endorsing New Deal–era authority of the
federal government.15 She zealously advocated for women’s suffrage
and women’s professional equality, yet did not support the Equal
Rights Amendment.16 She supported the death penalty, but was a
vocal advocate for anti-war and world peace.17 She served as a
prosecutor, but proactively instituted protections for defendants like
speedy trials and psychiatric evaluations.18 Allen endorsed unions,
but supported businesses against unions.19 And her true passion
10. TUVE, supra note 1, at 53–56.
11. Judge Florence E. Allen, Women in Public Office, 44 WOMEN L.J., Feb. 22, 1958
at 4, 4; TUVE, supra note 1, at 136.
12. See Mary L. Clark, One Man’s Token Is Another Woman’s Breakthrough? The
Appointment of the First Woman Judges, 49 VILL. L. REV. 487, 497, 500 (2004).
13. See ALLEN, supra note 7; Joan E. Organ, Florence E. Allen and “Great Changes
in the Status of Women,” in BUILDERS OF OHIO: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY 218 (Warren
Van Tine & Michael Pierce, eds. 2003).
14. TUVE, supra note 1, at 126.
15. See id. at 92, 116–17, 126.
16. Like many progressive women supporting the labor movement, Allen approved
of protective legislation for women workers, which was thought to be threatened by equal
rights for women because labor laws of minimum wage and maximum hours were legally
premised on women’s difference and weakness. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420
(1908); Tracey Jean Boisseau & Tracy A. Thomas, After Suffrage Comes Equal Rights?
ERA as the Next Logical Step, 227, 234–37, in 100YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
(Holly J. McCammon & Lee Ann Banaszak, eds. 2018). Allen was also aligned with Maud
Wood Park, Carrie Chapman Catt, and the League of Women Voters all of whom opposed
Alice Paul and her ERA movement, due to Paul’s militantism during the suffrage
movement. Boisseau & Thomas, supra, at 230; TUVE, supra note 1, at 30–35.
17. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 56, 142.
18. See Clark, supra note 12, at 497.
19. See Arthur R. Landever, Four Remarkable Ohio Lawyers: The Cronise Sisters of
Tiffin, Florence Allen, and Cleveland Municipal Court’s “Hard-Boiled Mary” 31–32
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was the global peace movement, though she spent most of her career
focused on narrow questions of local law.20 These paradoxes reveal
a moderate approach to judicial decision making, closely tied to facts
and rules rather than politics or ideals.
Respected by her colleagues for what they called her “manly
mind,” Florence Allen fit the conventional ideal of a cautious and
thoughtful judge.21 When appointed to the federal appellate court,
U.S. Attorney General Homer Cummings emphasized that Allen was
“not appointed because she was a woman”; rather, he said “[a]ll we
did was to see that she was not rejected because she was a woman.”22
Her gender was discounted rather than affirmatively embraced.23
After becoming a judge, Judge Allen disappeared into the bench,
believing strongly in the importance and appearance of impartiality.24
Her decisions rarely evidence any greater cause or legal philosophy.
Instead, they illustrate the careful, daily work of adjudicating cases
one at a time on the facts and merits. She endorsed judicial re-
straint, efficiency and judicial management, and was acknowledged
by colleagues and supporters for her hard work, “high morality,”
intellect, and clear writing.25
A key question at the time of Allen’s judicial appointment, as
now, is whether women judge differently than men.26 In Allen’s
time, there was fear that a woman would be more moralistic, stem-
ming from the prohibition and temperance movements, or more
emotional or anti-intellectual in approach.27 Today, studies have
sought to find a connection between gender and judicial outcome.28
Some studies have suggested that women jurists are more likely to
support plaintiffs in sexual harassment, employment, and immigra-
tion cases, or vote more liberally in death penalty and obscenity
cases.29 Yet other studies have found little evidence that women
(Oct. 19, 1994) (manuscript), https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/609
[https://perma.cc/TR7D-V4EJ]; TUVE, supra note 1, at 109.
20. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 79–92, 142.
21. Clark, supra note 12, at 499 (citing Memorandum Prepared for Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation by F.A. Tamm (Feb. 15, 1939)).
22. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 95.
23. See id.
24. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 67, 87.
25. Id. at 87, 115, 153.
26. See id. at 91–92, 125.
27. Id. at 30, 33, 37.
28. See Christina Boyd & Lee Epstein, When Women Rule, It Makes a Difference,
WASH.POST(May 3, 2009), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009
/05/01/AR2009050103406.html [https://perma.cc/95ZP-Z9AB].
29. See id.; Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406 (2010) (finding the probability of
a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination decreases when the judge
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judge differently from men.30 Judge Allen’s record, as this Article
will show, supports the second conclusion: that women judge no dif-
ferently than men. In fact, Allen worked hard to refute any claim that
women judged differently. She worked repeatedly to refute claims
of women’s judicial incompetency, and instead molded herself in the
male norm to prove that women could “think like a man,” which to
her meant crafting clear, objective, authoritative decisions unen-
cumbered by emotion or her former pro-woman idealism.31
This Article delves into the life and work of Judge Allen to
provide insight to the contributions and jurisprudence of the first
woman judge. For history questions what difference putting a woman
on the bench might have made.32 Part I explores Allen’s early influ-
ences on her intellectual development grounded in her progressive
and politically active family, and her close network of female profes-
sional friends. Part II discusses her pivotal work with the women’s
suffrage movement, working with the national organizations in New
York and leading the legal and political efforts in Ohio. This pro-
active commitment to gender justice, however, would not survive her
ascension to the bench. Once on the court, few cases raised issues of
women’s rights, and in those that did, Allen offered only neutral
support.33 Instead, her initial entrée to the judicial profession on the
common pleas court focused on judicial management, legal process,
and being tough on crime, while supportive of defendant’s rights.34
Part III traces these cases, highlighting her notoriety as a judge
against mafia and corrupt lawyers and judges. Part IV then analyzes
Allen’s jurisprudence from her decade on the state supreme court,
following the wide variety of cases before her and tracking her de-
veloping reputation as a moderate, but politically inconsistent judge.
Part V explores Allen’s decisions from her twenty-five years on the
federal court of appeals, reconciling her reputation as a Roosevelt
is male); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Asylum in a Different Voice: Judging Immigration Claims
and Gender, in REFUGEEROULETTE:DISPARITIESINASYLUM ADJUDICATIONANDPROPOSALS
FORREFORM 202, 208 (Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al. eds., 2009) (finding female immigration
judges granted asylum at a rate of 53%, while male judges granted asylum at a rate of
37.3%); Donald R. Songer & Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision
Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 750, 759 (2000) (finding female judges
on state supreme courts vote more liberally than male judges in death penalty and
obscenity cases and increase likelihood that male judge will adopt the liberal position).
30. See Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial
Appointment: A Re-Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 311–13 (2010) (finding
little evidence that women judges vote differently than men).
31. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 91–92, 136.
32. See JEFFERSON & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 210.
33. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 161.
34. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 47–48, 50–51.
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liberal with her moderate and bipartisan decisions. The final section
of the Article then analyzes Allen’s judicial career, tracing her failed
nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court and evaluating her limited
legacy to the profession. Her once zealous advocacy of gender justice
fizzled into simple polite encouragement of women in the legal pro-
fession. Overall, this story reveals the jurisprudence of the first
woman judge, crafted carefully to reflect a moderate judge, fitting
within the male-centric norms of the profession, and discarding any
promise of women’s advocacy on the bench.
I. EARLY INFLUENCES: PROGRESSIVE FAMILY AND FEMALE FRIENDS
Florence Allen was a tall woman, almost six feet, large boned,
heavy, and athletic.35 She was physically active, famously walking
to work at five in the morning or over the lunch hour, regardless of
weather.36 As a child, Allen hiked the mountains in her home state
of Utah, and preferred household chores like chopping wood that
were manual rather than domestic.37 As an adult, Allen continued
her love of hiking during many summers in Colorado’s Estes Na-
tional Park and long country weekend walks on the east side of
Cleveland, “clad in full knickers and men’s hiking shoes.”38 Allen
was often surrounded by dogs and continued her love of playing the
piano, once thought to be a possible career.39 She shared a back-
ground similar to many other judges of the time, coming from a
Protestant family of English descent, from the professional middle
class, and raised with a deep sense of social consciousness.40
Two key influences emerge as important to her intellectual de-
velopment and world-view. The first influence was her progressive
family. Allen’s family was politically active, with her father serving
as a state and federal representative from Utah, and her mother
leading national suffrage and motherhood organizations.41 Her family
instilled an ethic of community, service, and contribution that fueled
Allen’s work ethic and demand for a public life.42 The second influ-
ence on Allen’s professional and intellectual development was her
close network of female friends. These friendships among political
35. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 12, 65.
36. See Florence Allen, Diary, in Florence E. Allen Papers, 1932–1936, Box 4, Folder
1 (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society Archives) [hereinafter Allen Papers];
TUVE, supra note 1, at 81.
37. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 14; TUVE, supra note 1, at 8.
38. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 44; TUVE, supra note 1, at 81, 134.
39. Organ, supra note 13, at 220; TUVE, supra note 1, at 134.
40. TUVE, supra note 1, at 162.
41. See Cook, supra note 6, at 21–22; TUVE, supra note 1, at 6–7.
42. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 2, 9–10.
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leaders of the women’s suffrage movement in New York City and
Ohio pushed Allen towards a progressivism feeding her personal
development as a professional, unmarried woman.43 These women,
many lawyers, activists, and lesbians, modeled an alternative model
of women’s role in society free from the domestic family. And it
would be these women who would loyally support Allen throughout
her life and career.44
A. Family, Service, and Community
Florence Allen was born on March 23, 1884, in Salt Lake City,
Utah, after her family relocated there from the Western Reserve of
Northeastern Ohio.45 Florence was born three years after the move,
the third of six children.46 Allen’s father, Clarence Emir Allen (“Emir”),
had been a professor of Greek and Latin at Western Reserve College
in Hudson, Ohio.47 He gained his five minutes of fame by being the
first college baseball player in Ohio to throw a curve ball, helping
Reserve beat Oberlin College 36 to 5 in 1877.48 Emir was diagnosed
with terminal tuberculosis, and the family moved to Utah as a last
ditch effort to save his life, on the advice and help of his friend,
Liberty Holden, founder of the Cleveland Plain Dealer.49 The move
worked, and Emir survived even after losing one lung, going on to
study law and work as a mining manager.50 He was elected seven
times to the territorial legislature, making contributions to the law
of workplace maximum hours laws, occupational safety, and public
schools.51 Upon Utah’s admission as a state, Emir was elected in
1895 as one of the first state representatives to the U.S. Congress.52
However, he served only one term, opposing, like other pro-silver
43. See Organ, supra note 13, at 218–27.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 219.
46. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 4.
47. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 2.
48. See Letter from J.P. Barden to Mrs. [Helen] Fitzmiller (May 14, 1936) (on file with
the Western Reserve Academy Archives, Hudson, Ohio) (stating Allen learned the curve
pitch while playing semi-professional baseball the summer before with the Keystones in
Erie, Pennsylvania); Paul Packard, The Historic Spot Which Witnessed the First College
Curve (c. 1938) (on file with the WRA Archives); Grad Pitches First “Curve” in College Ball,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, c. 1970.
49. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 2.
50. Id.
51. See Letter from Clarence Emir Allen to Hon. R.N. Baskin (Dec. 6, 1911) (on file
in Allen Papers, Box 1, Folder 1) (discussing public school legislation); H.F. No.1 in the
Utah House of Representatives, introduced by Clarence Allen (Jan. 14, 1890) (on file in
Allen Papers, Box 1, Folder 1) (establishing free public schools).
52. JOAN SMYTH IVERSEN,THE ANTIPOLYGAMY CONTROVERSY IN U.S.WOMEN’S MOVE-
MENTS, 1880–1925: A DEBATE ON THE AMERICAN HOME 192 (1997).
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dissenters, the Republican Party’s endorsement of the gold standard
and the 1896 Republican national convention nomination of Ohioan
William McKinley for president, and he became entangled in the
unsuccessful crusade to unseat Mormon Senator Reed Smoot.53
Allen’s mother, Corinne Tuckerman Allen, was a community
activist.54 She was one of the first women to attend Smith College,
although she did not graduate.55 A year before her death, in writing
to Alice Stone Blackwell, the daughter of suffrage leader Lucy Stone,
Corinne recalled that her father had been a classmate of Stone’s at
Oberlin College.56 “She [Lucy Stone] converted my father to the prin-
ciple of feminism and I was brought up a suffragist. My father
educated me just the same as he would [have] a boy, believing that
a woman needed intellectual training as well as a man.”57 She was,
however, more aligned with the conservative branch of the women’s
movement, grounded in the politics of domesticity and a woman’s
proper role as leader in the home.58
Corinne became a zealous anti-polygamy activist, railing against
the polygamous practices she found in her new hometown of Salt
Lake City.59 Even after the Woodruff Manifesto in 1890 under which
the Mormon Church renounced polygamy, Corinne believed the prac-
tice had simply gone underground and was still an immoral, preva-
lent practice in the society around her.60 She would continue this
anti-polygamy crusade into the 1920s, long after the national fervor
had died down, believing the possible resurgence of polygamy to be
a real threat.61 She used her platforms in leadership with the Mother’s
Congress (later the Parent Teacher Organization), and the Utah
state woman’s suffrage association to further this anti-polygamy
zeal, seeking to oust Mormon women even while she had worked
with them previously in Utah’s early enfranchisement of women.62
53. See id. at 214–15, 222.
54. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 9–10.
55. Beverly Blair Cook, Women as Supreme Court Candidates: From Florence Allen
to Sandra O’Connor, 65 JUDICATURE 314, 317 (1982); TUVE, supra note 1, at 3.
56. IVERSEN, supra note 52, at 246.
57. Id. at 247 (citing Letter from Corinne Allen to Alice Stone Blackwell, n.d. (c.1930)
(on file in National Association of Woman Suffrage Association Papers (NAWSA), Library
of Congress)).
58. See id. at 247.
59. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 7.
60. See IVERSEN, supra note 52, at 176, 252.
61. See id. at 246–52 (citing Mrs. Clarence E. Allen, Have You Taught Your Child to be
a Monogamist, CHILD WELFARE MAG. 10 (Feb. 1916) (on file in Allen Papers, Box 1,
Folder 1) (establishing a “Sex Morality Code” of the National Congress of Mothers and
Parent Teacher Association for the monogamous “ideal of normal family life,” which
included opposition to sex education in the schools, and teaching children not to mas-
turbate)).
62. IVERSEN, supra note 52.
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Florence, at the age of twelve, moved back to the Cleveland area
to live with her maternal grandparents while her father served in
Washington, D.C. She attended her grandfather’s New Lyme School,
and then the Women’s College of the Western Reserve University.63
In high school, she emerged as a leader among her peers, called
“Cousin Jo” by classmates for her resemblance to Louisa May Alcott’s
independent-minded character in the classic book, Little Women,
who, like Jo, starred in school plays, often assuming the male lead.64
For her “‘swan song’ as the editor of the high school literary journal,
she wrote an editorial condemning sororities as undemocratic—
though she herself had been a member of one.”65
In 1904, then age twenty, Florence went to Berlin for two years
with her mother and siblings.66 Her mother was there in part for her
work with the International Congress of Women on suffrage, though
Corinne used the occasion to crusade against polygamy and seek the
exclusion of Mormon women from the suffrage movement.67 While
abroad, Florence studied music and piano, wrote music criticism for
the German Times, and wrote a book of poetry, Patris (the Greek word
for homeland).68 Pre-war Berlin was a revolutionary place, with acti-
vism on women’s suffrage, as well as early gay rights.69 During this
time, theater and music critic Theo Anna Sprungli spoke to the
Scientific-Humanitarian Committee on the subject of “Homosexual-
ity and the Women’s Movement,” helping to initiate a movement of
lesbian activism.70 Allen, however, did not like her time in Germany,
feeling unfit for her dream of becoming a concert pianist, and grow-
ing to abhor much of German culture.71 She complained in her diary
that German women did “unwomanly things” and that they overem-
phasized the physical aspects of marriage rather than the com-
panionate and produced too many illegitimate children.72 Allen
seemed to reject the emerging feminist focus on sex-positive rights
of sexuality, not yet associating with any pro-woman ideals.
63. GRETAANDERSON,MORETHAN PETTICOATS:REMARKABLEOHIO WOMEN 96 (2005).
64. Id. at 99.
65. Id.
66. Organ, supra note 13, at 220.
67. See IVERSEN, supra note 52, at 221.
68. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 21–22; TUVE, supra note 1, at 19–20.
69. See Alex Ross, Berlin Story: How the Germans Invented Gay Rights—More Than
a Century Ago, NEWYORKER (Jan. 19, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015
/01/26/berlin-story [https://perma.cc/F8MT-NZRJ]; ROBERTBEACHY,GAYBERLIN:BIRTH-
PLACE OF A MODERN IDENTITY xvii–xix, 85–87 (2014).
70. Ross, supra note 69.
71. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 21–22; TUVE, supra note 1, at 17.
72. TUVE, supra note 1, at 17; Florence Allen, Diary, Aug. 29, 1904 (on file in Allen
Papers, Box 3, Folder 1).
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B. Finding Feminist Friends
The twenty-two-year-old Florence Allen broke apart from her
family in 1906, moving back to Cleveland and extended family while
her parents and siblings returned to Utah.73 She began the path of
self-discovery, seeking an outlet for her intellectualism and a mean-
ingful role in life.74 At first alone, she ultimately gravitated to women
reformers, first in the settlement house movement and then in the
suffrage movement.75 Female colleagues in law school and activists in
New York City provided a more radical influence, shifting and shaping
Allen’s views more firmly in support of women and women’s issues.76
On her own in Cleveland, Allen flailed about for a way to support
herself financially and intellectually.77 She became a music critic for
the Plain Dealer newspaper and a teacher of music, German, Greek,
and history at Laurel School for Girls.78 Her mind, however, hungered
for “words and ideas,” and she took graduate courses for a master’s
degree in political science at Western Reserve University.79 Allen par-
ticularly liked Professor Augustus Hatton’s courses in international
law, comparative governments, and municipal law, and through
taking those courses, it “came to her ‘like a flash out of the blue’”
that she wanted to be a lawyer.80 Hatton encouraged her to enroll in
law school.81
By that time, law had become one of the most prestigious profes-
sions, as lawyers and law schools had become professionalized, and
“going to law school was one of the best routes to honor, acclaim and
financial success.”82 However, as the legal profession formalized
through schools rather than apprenticeship, “women were squeezed
out because law schools were not open to them.”83 “[T]he law remained
73. Organ, supra note 13, at 220.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 220–21.
76. See id. at 221–22.
77. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 21.
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id. at 21.
80. Id.; Betty Browning, Interview with a Feminist—Florence Allen, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Sept. 17, 1939, at G3.
81. TUVE, supra note 1, at 21.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 22. The first woman lawyer in Cleveland, Mary Spargo, began practice in
1885 after serving an apprenticeship with the law firm, Morrow & Morrow. JAMES
HARRISON KENNEDY, A HISTORY OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND: ITS SETTLEMENT, RISE AND
PROGRESS 470 (1896). Spargo was admitted to practice by the Ohio Supreme Court, but
had previously been refused an appointment as a notary public on the grounds that the
constitution did not permit it. Id. A large portion of her clients were women, as she
intended and expected, but also included male clients, and her work was not confined to
“clerical or subordinate duties.” Id.
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a male fortress, with lawyers concerned mostly with aspects of private
property, business incorporation, crime, and legal affairs,” subjects
“with which women supposedly . . . should not be concerned.”84 The
long-prevailing assumption was that women were intellectually
inferior to men and lacked a logical and rational mind.85 Early femi-
nist leaders, like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Sarah Grimké, chal-
lenged these gendered assumptions from the early 1800s, seeking to
advance women’s position through equal access to higher education.86
Western Reserve Law School did not admit women at the time,
so Allen looked elsewhere (although the other local school, Cleve-
land Law School, did admit women to its part-time evening pro-
gram).87 Allen enrolled at the University of Chicago Law School in
1909, one of only four women at the law school.88 She was some-
times the only woman in a classroom of one hundred men and
“found it an embarrassing ‘ordeal.’”89 The rules of “ladies first” still
applied, as a woman’s arrival at the door of a classroom prompted
a dozen men to stand aside when she entered, a form of attention
she did not care for.90 Nevertheless, by the end of the winter quar-
ter, Allen was ranked second in the class, and was recognized for
having “a masculine mind,” ruled by reason rather than emotion.91
Allen noted in her diary that the renowned legal scholar and future
dean of Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound, then a professor at
Chicago and known for his “orotund pomposity,” didn’t like women
students, and “whale[d]” against one woman over contracts.92 She
noted in her autobiography that “the four women in Chicago Univer-
sity Law School when I was there felt he discouraged us in our wish
to practice law. He thought it was no field for a woman.”93 Allen was
84. TUVE, supra note 1, at 22. Fifteen years later, in 1920, “when the proportion of
women in the [legal] profession[] reached [its] peak, less than three per cent of the []
profession was female.” Id.
85. See Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers and the Quest for Professional Identity
in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2414, 2416 (1990).
86. See Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address on Woman’s Rights (Sept. 1848), in THE
SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 94, 98 (Ann D.
Gordon, ed. 1998); SARAH M. GRIMKÉ, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND THE
CONDITION OF WOMEN (1837).
87. See Landever, supra note 19, at 25.
88. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 21–22.
89. Id. at 22.
90. ANDERSON, supra note 63, at 100.
91. TUVE, supra note 1, at 22 (internal quotations omitted).
92. Joan Ellen Organ, Sexuality as a Category of Historical Analysis: A Study of Judge
Florence E. Allen, 1884–1966 70 (Jan. 1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve
University); DAVID WIGDOR,ROSCOE POUND:PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 146(1974); John Henry
Schlegel, Book Review, Roscoe Pound: Philosopher of Law, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1656,
1656–57 (1977).
93. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 49.
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unhappy in Chicago, where money was short and friends were few.94
Jobs as a housemaid and then a library clerk “cataloging French
and German legal treatises” were drudgery.95 She did connect with
Jane Addams and the Hull House Settlement, befriending and
working a bit with the emerging social workers there.96
Disillusioned in Chicago, in summer 1910, Allen transferred to
New York University Law School.97 NYU was one of the largest law
schools in the country, and had by then admitted eighty-two women
among its total enrollment of 600.98 She first enrolled in the evening
division, but soon transferred to the day division as she prioritized
law school above work.99 Women students at NYU met regularly and
listened to speeches designed to compensate for their supposedly
deficient life skills, for example to learn general business knowledge
like reading a broker’s statement.100 They were told “[t]hey must
work the clock around day in and day out and be at the beck and
call of business when it comes” rather than being detoured by “some
side issue.”101 Women were also told they must compensate for the
fact that the voice and physical appearance of the average women
lawyer “does not produce the impression of authority and aggressive-
ness” which are key characteristics of a lawyer (defined as male).102
Allen needed to support herself in law school, as the family’s
limited budget was dedicated to her two brothers’ college education
at Yale.103 Allen first took a position with the immigrant settlement
houses, building on her social work and connections from Hull
House.104 Allen worked for the New York League for the Protection
of Immigrants under lawyer Frances Kellor and “dealt with matters
of employment, education, naturalization, and living” conditions for
immigrants.105 Allen went to Ellis Island to meet newly arrived
people, and lived and worked at the Henry Street Settlement in
Manhattan.106 That position did not last long, for Allen did not find
the work satisfying, detested the living conditions and bug infesta-
tion in the settlements, and realized little financial remuneration in
94. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 22–23.
95. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 24.
96. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 23.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 24–25.
100. See id. at 25.
101. Id.
102. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 25.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 23.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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a social work job that was based on women’s volunteerism.107 Allen
found another job with the National College Women for Equal Suf-
frage that paid forty dollars per month, serving as an assistant
secretary to suffrage leader Maud Wood Park, which brought Allen
into the inner circle of the women’s suffrage movement and launched
her work as a zealous suffrage advocate.108 She also gave paid lec-
tures on current events to the New York Board of Education and pri-
vate girls’ schools.109 Allen’s time in New York was transformational.
She established lifelong friends and colleagues from progressive
suffrage circles who would be pivotal in her future legal work and
judicial campaigns.110
These women provided an alternative social model for Allen, as
many rejected conventional marriage for professional careers and
some entered lesbian partnerships.111 Allen herself never married
or had children.112 She had two long-term roommates: Susan Rebhan
for fourteen years from 1922 to 1935, and then after Susan’s untimely
death from complications from the flu, thirty years with Mary
Pierce.113 For a short time, all three women lived in the same house-
hold.114 Susan and then Mary served as social and professional sec-
retary for Florence, taking on the cooking and homemaking work as
well.115 When Judge Allen was asked about how she did housework,
she retorted “I don’t cook, or sew, or shop, for the simple reason that
I haven’t the time or energy for these things, any more than the
men judges have.”116 Susan attended Ohio State University Law
School when Allen was on the Ohio Supreme Court.117 Mary worked
as teacher at a private school in Cleveland, then as companion to
Allen.118 Allen also left her estate to Mary.119
These domestic partnerships between Allen and a female part-
ner, called “Boston marriages”120 in the nineteenth century, as well
107. See id. at 24.
108. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 26.
109. Id.
110. See Cook, supra note 55, at 319.
111. See Organ, supra note 92, at 64, 71.
112. Florence Ellinwood Allen, supra note 2.
113. Organ, supra note 92, at 7.
114. See id. at 150.
115. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 63, 80.
116. Cook, supra note 55, at 318.
117. TUVE, supra note 1, at 80.
118. Id. at 131.
119. Organ, supra note 92, at 150.
120. Boston marriages were not unheard of among wealthy and privileged women of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and gave women the opportunity to have
close personal friendships based on equality and the freedom to pursue careers and
political activism. See LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY
OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 18–21 (1991).
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as her close inner circle of lesbian friends have led some modern
scholars to assume that Allen was gay.121 If true, Allen herself was not
out about it.122 Nor is there any evidence in her biography or remain-
ing public papers, although Allen and Mary culled those carefully
before donation.123 In her diary, Allen notes only that she talked
“lesbianism and marriage,” during one weekend in the country, and
read and circulated the book Marriage as a Trade, which argued for
women to reject marriage in favor of a professional career.124 How-
ever, any social acceptance of lesbianism that might have existed in
the early century of New York City, quickly faded over the decades
of Allen’s adulthood, increasing in social taboo and repression with
the conservatism through the 1950s.125 Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that Allen, even if gay, would not have so identified, as the first
lesbian judge appointed to a federal court was in 1994, and the first
openly gay judge in Ohio was not until 2007.126
After graduating from law school in 1913 at the age of twenty-
nine, Allen moved back to Cleveland to earn a living.127 She practiced
law, opening her own office after other doors remained closed.128 At
one interview, garnered through family connections, the partner at
the small firm dismissed her as an applicant, looking out the win-
dow at the lightly falling snow and saying he could never send a
121. See Organ, supra note 92, at 11–12; Karen O’Connor & Alixandra B. Yanus, Women
as Leaders in Lesbian Organizations, in GENDER AND WOMEN’SLEADERSHIP:AREFERENCE
HANDBOOK 245, 247 (Karen O’Connor ed., 2010); Sally J. Kenney, “It Would be Stupendous
for Us Girls”: Campaigning for Women Judges Without Waiving, in BREAKING THE WAVE:
WOMEN, THEIR ORGANIZATIONS, AND FEMINISM 1945–1985 209, 214–15 (Kathleen A.
Laughlin & Jacqueline Castledine eds., 2011); LILLIAN FADERMAN,TO BELIEVE IN WOMEN:
WHAT LESBIANS HAVE DONE FOR AMERICA—A HISTORY 20–21 (1999). Other evidence of
Allen’s sexual orientation cited includes rumors about her unmarried status surrounding
her U.S. Supreme Court candidacy and a letter Allen wrote to Marion Harron, a judge
on the federal tax court in a reappointment battle and reputed lesbian, in which she
cautions her colleague about “women like us.” See Organ, supra note 92, at 242.
122. See Kenney, supra note 121, at 209, 214–15.
123. See Organ, supra note 92, at 30.
124. See id. at 93, 148 (citing Florence Allen, Diary, June 4, 1920 & Nov. 20, 1923); see
also CICELY HAMILTON, MARRIAGE AS A TRADE, at v–vii (1909).
125. See Organ, supra note 92, at 75 n.27, 231.
126. Andy Towle, With Mary Wiseman, Ohio Gets Its First Openly Gay Judge, TOWLE-
ROAD (Oct. 31, 2007), https://www.towleroad.com/2007/10/with-mary-wisem [https://
perma.cc/7TBG-FG4B] (appointed to Court of Common Pleas). The first lesbian federal
judge was appointed in 1994 when President Bill Clinton appointed Deborah Batts to the
Southern District Court of New York in Manhattan. See Jared Ham & Chan Tov
McNamarah, Note, Queer Eyes Don’t Sympathize: An Empirical Investigation of LGB
Identity and Judicial Decision Making, 105 CORNELL L.REV. 589, 607 n.85 (2020) (citing
Henry J. Reske, Appointment Breaks Barrier: First Openly Gay Federal Judge Assumes
Duties, ABA J. 29, 29 (1994)).
127. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 26, 35.
128. See id. at 40.
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woman out in such weather.129 Allen handled cases that came in the
door, including legal aid referred work, and she served as lead attor-
ney for the national and state women’s suffrage movement.130 Her
first case was helping a woman divorce her abusive husband.131 She
was appointed an assistant county prosecutor in Cleveland in 1919
by a Democratic administration, with the prosecutor allaying con-
cerns about her gender by saying, “I consider that Miss Allen will do
a man’s job in our office. I rate her as the equal of virtually any male
attorney.”132 Allen became the first woman prosecutor in the coun-
try, and the first woman admitted to the Ohio Bar Association.133
Allen handled one particularly notable case on behalf of women’s
rights, in Employees v. Cleveland Railway Co.134 Three hundred
women replaced street car conductors when the men left their jobs
to fight in World War I, but lost their jobs upon the men’s return.135
The company initially refused to fire the women, but the union went
on strike paralyzing Cleveland transportation for three days, and
the company settled the strike by replacing the women.136 Florence
Allen became deeply involved in advising the “conductorettes” and
filed a complaint with the National War Labor Board (NWLB), an
alternative dispute resolution board providing both mediation and
arbitration services to keep labor from striking during the war.137
Initially the board summarily upheld the company’s decision, allow-
ing the replacement of the women by returning men, but recom-
mended the company make “every effort” to assign the displaced
women to other positions.138 Allen petitioned for rehearing, which
129. See id.
130. See Howard, supra note 9.
131. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 40.
132. Id. at 53.
133. Id.; STEPHANEELISEBOOTH,BUCKEYEWOMEN:THEHISTORY OF OHIO’SDAUGHTERS
84 (2001).
134. See In re Employees, N.W.L.B., No. 491 (Dec. 3, 1918), rev’d after rehearing, In re
Employees v. Cleveland Railway Co., N.W.L.B., No. 491 (Mar. 17, 1919), available in
Bulletin of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 287, National War Labor Board, 7,
304–05 (Dec. 1922), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/bls/bls_0287_1922
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GK5-Z8DS].
135. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 49.
136. See id.
137. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see VALERIE JEAN CONNER, THE NATIONAL WAR
LABOR BOARD: STABILITY, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND THE VOLUNTARY STATE IN WORLD WAR I
150–51 (1983); Richard B. Gregg, The National War Labor Board, 33 HARV. L. REV. 39,
44–45 (1919). A general precept of the NWLB was that all women hired during the war
were to receive equal pay for equal work. See Gregg, supra, at 43.
138. See In re Employees v. Cleveland Railway Co., N.W.L.B., No. 491 (Mar. 17, 1919),
rev’d after rehearing, available in Bulletin of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 287,
National War Labor Board, 7, 304–05 (Dec. 1922), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs
/publications/bls/bls_0287_1922.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GK5-Z8DS].
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was granted based on her arguments that the “women did not have
their day in court” as they were not permitted to be heard at the
first meeting.139
The NWLB, in an opinion by former President William H. Taft
and Basil Manly, reversed its prior decision, finding an “injustice [had
been] done” by the previous order and ordering that the company
restore the remaining women seeking employment to their posi-
tions.140 It relied on another decision by the same chairmen in a
Detroit case reinstating women conductors against challenge by the
union that it was a closed shop, finding the equities of the case sup-
ported the particular women, even though it agreed that there were
reasons generally to conclude that women were less suited to con-
ductor work demanding long hours and police enforcement duties.141
The board in the Cleveland case was also swayed by the factual
realities that the railway had plenty of job vacancies, enough to hire
the men and also retain the remaining sixty-four women.142 The
company, however, ignored the recommendation of the non-binding
NWLB, and the women lost their jobs.143 However, when another
labor exigency arose during World War II, the Cleveland street car
companies again hired women as conductors, even though an Ohio
law specifically prohibited women from working such long shifts.144
Most of Allen’s biggest cases from her seven years of practice
were related to advancing women’s suffrage in Ohio.145 These cases
used the legal system in a careful and precise way to guide women’s
right to vote and challenge opponents at each painstakingly slow
step of the process.146
II. ADVOCATING FOR WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE
Florence Allen worked for the woman’s suffrage movement as
an activist and attorney for a decade, from 1911 to 1920, during her
late twenties and into her thirties.147 She was familiar with and
supportive of the demands for women’s suffrage from her childhood
139. Id. at 305.
140. Id.
141. See id.; CONNER, supra note 137, at 153, 156.
142. See In re Employees v. Cleveland Railway Co., N.W.L.B., No. 491 (Mar. 17, 1919),
rev’d after rehearing, available in Bulletin of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No.
287, National War Labor Board, 7, 305 (Dec. 1922), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs
/publications/bls/bls_0287_1922.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GK5-Z8DS].
143. See CONNER, supra note 137, at 156; TUVE, supra note 1, at 49.
144. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 156.
145. See id. at 35–36, 42–43.
146. See id. at 42–43.
147. See id. at 36.
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in Utah, where her mother was active in the suffrage movement and
where women had gained the right to vote.148 The Utah territory
granted women the right to vote in 1870, one year after Wyoming
became the first state to grant women suffrage, in part to demon-
strate that women were not oppressed under polygamy.149 Suffrage
leaders Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony came to
Utah in 1871 to speak with women and herald one of the first states
to grant the voting privilege.150 The federal Edmunds-Tucker Anti-
Polygamy Act of 1887, however, disenfranchised Utah women voters
as a penalty for the territory’s continued polygamy.151 Women’s right
to vote was restored in 1896 when Utah became a state after dis-
avowing polygamy.152
In 1911, when Allen first joined the ranks of active suffrage
work, the women’s suffrage movement was sixty-three years old.153
Since July 19, 1848 at Seneca Falls, New York, women had been
demanding the right of suffrage and the right to shared power and
governance in society.154 Initially focused on campaigns to reform
the voting law of every state, the post–Civil War advent of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments constitutionalized the right
to vote and provided a new opportunity to seek a Sixteenth Amend-
ment for women’s suffrage.155 The first women’s suffrage amend-
ment was proposed in 1869, briefly introduced to Congress in 1878,
and debated once in 1887, but otherwise languished dormant in con-
gressional committee.156 In 1875, the U.S. Supreme Court in Minor
v. Happersett rejected suffrage leaders’ additional argument that
voting was already a right of federal citizenship protected by the
newly enacted Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and held instead that voting was a right of citizenship
granted by the state.157 Women activists continued to be split on the
best strategy for suffrage.158 Some like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
Susan B. Anthony called for a federal strategy of constitutional
148. See id. at 26.
149. See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, SUFFRAGE: WOMEN’S LONG BATTLE FOR THE VOTE 119
(2020); SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 95–96 (2002).
150. See GORDON, supra note 149, at 97; IVERSEN, supra note 52, at 25.
151. See GORDON, supra note 149, at 166.
152. See id. at 201; IVERSEN, supra note 52, at 175.
153. See Report of the Woman’s Rights Convention, Held at Seneca Falls, N.Y., July
19th and 20th, 1848 (1848).
154. See id.
155. See Lisa Tetrault, Winning the Vote, 40 HUMANITIES MAG. No. 3 (Summer 2019).
156. See id.
157. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175 (1875).
158. See Tetrault, supra note 155.
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amendment.159 Others like Lucy Stone and Carrie Chapman Catt,
leader of the merged National American Woman’s Suffrage Associa-
tion (NAWSA), focused on state campaigns, until 1916 Catt’s “Win-
ning Plan” embraced a two-track approach of a federal amendment
priority accompanied by selective state strategies.160 State campaigns
over the decades achieved some scattered success by the early twen-
tieth century when Allen joined the movement, with some states
adopting school board suffrage, others municipal suffrage, and six
Western states passing full suffrage.161
Ohio was a leading battleground in the state strategy for women’s
suffrage throughout this time.162 It had been one of the earliest states
after Seneca Falls to organize at the grassroots level, with the Salem
Convention on Woman’s Rights in 1850, and the Akron Woman’s
Rights Convention in 1851.163 Ohio women had sought an amend-
ment to the state constitution as part of the constitutional conven-
tion to guarantee women’s right to vote.164 Reorganizing again after
the Civil War, Ohio women secured school board suffrage in 1894,
which was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1896.165 A leader of
the NAWSA national suffrage organization, Harriet Taylor Upton,
lived in Youngstown where she moved the headquarters of the organi-
zation and helped focus the energy for suffrage in her home state.166
Allen first became actively involved in women’s suffrage through
her job during law school working as assistant secretary to Maud
159. See id.
160. See Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, A Short History of the Woman Suffrage Movement
in America, in ONEWOMAN,ONEVOTE:REDISCOVERING THE WOMANSUFFRAGEMOVEMENT
9, 17 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995); see also Tetrault, supra note 155.
161. AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890–1920,
at 231 (1981); App. One: The Electoral Thermometer: Woman Suffrage Won by State Con-
stitutional Amendments and Legislative Acts Before the Proclamation of the Nineteenth
Amendment, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVE-
MENT 375, 375 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, ed. 1995) (noting full suffrage granted in
Wyoming (1890), Colorado (1893), Idaho (1896), Utah (1896), Washington (1910), and
California (1911)). Later, two states, Arkansas and Texas, would also pass primary suf-
frage, allowing women to vote in primary elections. Id. at 376.
162. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 30.
163. See HISTORY OF WOMANSUFFRAGE, Vol. I, Chap. VI, Ohio 103–04 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1880); FLORENCE E. ALLEN &
MARY WELLES, THE OHIO WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT: “A CERTAIN UNALIENABLE
RIGHT”: WHAT OHIO WOMEN DID TO HELP SECURE IT 10 (1952).
164. Marjorie Stanton, The Woman Suffrage Movement in Ohio Prior to 1910, at 41
(1947) (M.A. thesis, Ohio State University).
165. See State ex rel. Mills v. Board of Elec. Columbus, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 36 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1895), aff’d without decision, 47 N.E. 1114 (Ohio 1896); see also Ralph H. Mikesell,
The Woman Suffrage Movement in Ohio 1910–1920, 10 (1934) (M.A. thesis, Ohio State
University); Stanton, supra note 164, at 48–49, 58.
166. See ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 38–39.
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Wood Park, the leader of the National College Women’s Equal Suf-
frage League.167 Park believed that the women’s suffrage movement
would move faster if younger college women organized in support.168
The twenty-seven-year-old Florence Allen worked with Park to sched-
ule speakers and organize local chapters for college women.169
In the summer of 1912, on break from law school, Allen came to
Ohio to help Park campaign for an amendment to the Ohio Constitu-
tion granting women the right to vote.170 Park and Inez Milholland
(later to become the iconic lady on the white horse in the New York
suffrage parade, and whom Allen also knew from NYU), had set up
a college suffrage chapter in Cleveland in 1910.171 A state constitu-
tional convention in 1912 gave women another opportunity to press
for the vote by amendment.172 The campaign became known as the
“Amendment 23” campaign because women’s suffrage was Amend-
ment 23 of 41 amendments presented to the legislature for special
election schedule for September 3, 1912.173 The culmination of the
campaign was Ohio’s first suffrage parade in Columbus of approxi-
mately 5,000 organized by the Ohio Woman’s Suffrage Association
(OWSA) on August 27, 1912.174 OWSA made attempts to include
Black suffragists by integrating the country delegations rather than
have a segregated Black section, and by including two floats from
Black suffragists.175 Allen canvassed the state in mostly rural areas,
giving ninety-two speeches in eighty-eight counties.176 She traveled
by trolley and buggy, giving speeches from literal soap boxes and
automobile back seats.177 She learned to deal with hecklers, and
honed her arguments, essentially adopting the classic arguments of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton by arguing that women were unjustly taxed
without representation, mirroring the key American demand for
freedom.178 Allen’s summer suffrage tour also established significant
friendships among suffrage women of both parties that would serve
167. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 26.
168. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 29.
169. See id. at 32; TUVE, supra note 1, at 26.
170. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 32–33.
171. See id. at 31.
172. See id.; see also Mikesell, supra note 165, at 12–14.
173. See ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 41; Eileen R. Rausch, “Let Ohio Women
Vote”: The Years to Victory, 1900–1920, 111–40 (1995) (Ph.D. dissertation, Notre Dame
University); see also Mikesell, supra note 165, at 32–39.
174. See Rausch, supra note 173, at 131, 134 n.73; ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163,
at 46.
175. See BOOTH, supra note 133, at 68–69.
176. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 32.
177. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 33.
178. See id. at 32–34, 38.
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Florence Allen holds the flag outside of suffrage headquarters, Upper
Euclid Ave., Cleveland (1912) (Library of Congress)
her well for the rest of her life as active supporters in judicial cam-
paigns.179 The suffrage amendment, however, failed in the fall, with
male voters rejecting it 335,000 to 295,000.180
Allen returned to NYU, where she graduated second in her
class in June 1913.181 During that senior year, she continued to work
for women’s suffrage in her spare time, giving speeches at the
NAWSA convention in Syracuse and to other groups at Swarthmore,
Cornell, Mount Holyoke, Barnard, and the Cleveland City Club.182
Allen marched in the massive suffrage parade to Washington, D.C.
held on March 3, 1913 and organized by Alice Paul and NAWSA,
“the largest peaceful protest ever assembled on D.C. streets to that
point.”183 The suffragists intended to call out President Woodrow
Wilson on the eve of his second inauguration for his opposition to
suffrage, and they effectively upstaged him.184 Lawyer Inez Milholland
led the great parade down Pennsylvania Ave, “clad in a white cape
astride a white horse, . . .[b]ehind her stretched a long line with nine
bands, four mounted brigades, three heralds, about twenty-four floats,
and more than 5,000 marchers.”185 Women from countries that had
enfranchised women came first in the procession; then the pioneers,
then sections celebrating working women grouped by occupation
179. See id. at 33.
180. See id. at 34.
181. Id. at 35.
182. Id. at 34.
183. Tetrault, supra note 155; TINA CASSIDY, MR. PRESIDENT, HOW LONG MUST WE
WAIT? ALICE PAUL, WOODROW WILSON, AND THE FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT TO VOTE 45 (2019).
184. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 34–35; Tetrault, supra note 155; DUBOIS, supra note
149, at 188–94.
185. Marching for the Vote: Remembering the Woman Suffrage Parade of 1913, LIBR.
OFCONG.RSCH.GUIDE, https://guides.loc.gov/american-women-essays/marching-for-the
-vote [https://perma.cc/DFU4-V97U].
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Florence Allen, marching for women’s suffrage (1913) (Kent State
University Libraries, Ashtabula)
and dressed for work; then the state delegations; Black women were
segregated at the back, though Ida B. Wells-Barnett challenged this
arrangement by moving up to her state contingent half way through
the parade.186 Crowds, however, comprised mostly of men attending
the inauguration, attacked the marchers and over one hundred
women were sent to the hospital.187 NAWSA had planned to present
the president with a petition, but organizers shied away from such
a direct gesture at the last minute.188 Allen left the march and re-
turned to New York where she tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the
board to change its mind about the petition.189 In the aftermath of
this lost opportunity, the young suffragist Alice Paul demanded more
militant political action following the English suffrage tactics of
Emmeline Pankhurst like pickets, attacks, and hunger strikes.190
Paul formed the Congressional Union of NAWSA, which later spun off
as the independent National Woman’s Party (NWP).191 Allen stayed
loyal to NAWSA, rejecting the militant action which she and other
conventional suffragists found to be an embarrassment and an im-
pediment to effective advocacy and persuasion.192
186. Id.; DUBOIS, supra note 149, at 191–92.
187. See Tetrault, supra note 155.
188. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 34.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 35, 41; DUBOIS, supra note 149, at 187–88.
191. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 35.
192. See id. at 35, 41.
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After graduation in 1913, Allen returned to Cleveland, drawn
by her suffrage friends and connections there.193 Even as she strug-
gled to find paying work, Allen served as the lead attorney for the
state woman’s suffrage association until her election to the bench in
1920.194 In 1913, women had begun a second campaign to amend the
state constitution for women’s suffrage, building on the new oppor-
tunity for voter initiatives and referendums adopted in the most
recent constitutional convention.195 As World War I began in Europe,
Allen took and passed the bar exam, and then traveled the state,
circulating petitions to get the required number of signatures for a
referendum.196 When 176 suffragists, two from each Ohio county,
tried to present the successful petition at the capitol, the secretary
of state refused to appear, even though he had met the liquor indus-
try for their proposed amendment hours before.197 The president of
the Ohio State University intervened to leave the petition with the
secretary’s office assistant.198
The women kicked off the Ohio campaign with a pilgrimage to
Salem, retracing the state origins of suffrage, and then held tea
parties, garden parties, bake sales, and bazaars to raise money and
support.199 “They canvassed the people, they followed political meet-
ings, they held street meetings, they did everything. Suffragists were
uniquely unselfconscious. They kept no records for posterity. They
did not realize that they were making history. Perhaps they were too
busy.”200 Allen canvassed rural Ohio again, now drawing larger au-
diences.201 She engaged in a very public debate with anti-suffragist
Lucy Price, who argued that women did not want the vote and wanted
to remain protected in the home.202 A large parade in Cleveland of
several thousand people dressed in suffrage white provided visible
support, but disappointedly did not include many business or indus-
try women who feared the loss of their jobs.203 A few Black women,
like Jane Hunter, founder of the Phillis Wheatley organization for
housing and training underprivileged Black girls, also joined the
193. See id. at 35–36.
194. See id. at 36; see also Florence Ellinwood Allen, supra note 2.
195. See ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 46; Rausch, supra note 173, at 187;
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196. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 36.
197. See id. at 37.
198. Id.
199. See ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 46; TUVE, supra note 1, at 38.
200. ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 46.
201. TUVE, supra note 1, at 38.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 39.
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parade.204 Cleveland newspaper writers and most Protestant minis-
ters were pro-suffrage, but strong anti-suffrage sentiment came
from the industrialists who opposed protective labor legislation like
minimum wage and maximum hour laws, and the liquor industry
that feared women’s temperance and reformers’ vote for prohibi-
tion.205 Opponents were well funded, hosting picnics for working men
with free beer, and plastering posters on trolleys and public spots.206
The women’s suffrage amendment was defeated, more soundly than
in 1912.207
After helping with women’s suffrage nationally in 1915, cam-
paigning in Boston and arranging speaking tours for English suf-
frage leader Emmeline Pankhurst, Allen turned her attention back
to Ohio in 1916 where she led the efforts to gain municipal suffrage
for women.208 The recent amendment to the Ohio state constitution
gave home rule to municipalities, which created an opportunity for
women to obtain suffrage in municipal or city council elections.209
The Illinois Supreme Court had upheld women’s municipal suffrage
the year before, and Allen thought that case as well as the Ohio Su-
preme Court case upholding school board suffrage provided good
precedent for a similar result in Ohio.210 Suffrage organizers se-
lected the prosperous middle-class city of East Cleveland as their
test case.211 Allen spent days in the office and library reading law
books, constitutions and charters, and election laws.212 She was paid
one hundred dollars to draft a new city charter for East Cleveland
granting municipal suffrage for women, which was passed by the
voters.213 When the Board of Elections refused to allow women to
vote, Allen filed a taxpayers’ mandamus action with the Ohio Su-
preme Court.214
“While the case was pending, Allen visited her family in Utah,”
and campaigned for President Wilson in Montana, directly con-
tradicting the NWP’s campaign against Wilson for his failure to
204. See id.
205. See id. at 30, 37–39, 52.
206. See id. at 39.
207. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 37–39; Rausch, supra note 173, at 231.
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support a federal suffrage amendment.215 In Montana, women were
voting for the first time, and they would elect the first woman to
Congress, Jeanette Rankin.216 While in Montana, Allen received a
wire notifying her that the East Cleveland case would be heard by the
Ohio Supreme Court in a few days.217 She recounted in her autobiog-
raphy her rush to return to Ohio in time for the hearing.218 While
there were other capable lawyers to handle the argument, Allen had
been the lead attorney on the case since the drafting of the charter.219
She wanted to be the one to argue before the court.220 She caught the
train in Great Falls, Montana, and reportedly gave explicit notice to
the train company of her need for a timely arrival, citing potential los-
ses of a thousand dollars from any delay, drawing on her law school
training regarding establishing foreseeability for recovery of conse-
quential damages.221 She wired two friends from Chicago Law School,
Alice Greenacre and Greta Coleman, who met her at the connecting
station in Chicago with a suitcase of law books, which Allen reviewed
overnight to Columbus in preparation for the argument.222 The Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of municipal suf-
frage.223 The Court, however, delayed announcement of the decision
until April, so women’s votes in East Cleveland were not counted in
the next election, though the cities of Columbus and Lakewood sub-
sequently adopted women’s suffrage charters.224
After the municipal suffrage success in the fall of 1916, Allen
began to work on a presidential suffrage bill, providing limited voting
rights for women in a presidential election.225 In 1913, Illinois became
the first state to pass presidential suffrage for women by legislative
enactment, which was upheld as constitutional.226 Politically, presi-
dential suffrage seemed practically more obtainable, as in most
states it was not subjected to public referenda like a state constitu-
tional amendment, and those public campaigns were expensive and
215. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 42.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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unsuccessful.227 Presidential suffrage would prove to be an effective
strategy on the road to the Nineteenth Amendment, as North Dakota,
Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Indiana passed presidential suffrage
in 1917, working in tandem with Allen’s efforts in Ohio, and ulti-
mately seventeen states would pass presidential suffrage.228 In Ohio,
Allen and her colleagues talked with every state legislator, and
Democratic Representative James A. Reynolds of Cuyahoga County
introduced the bill.229 Allen “did much legal work in connection with
this [bill],” and handled the hearing before the Ohio Senate.230 In
early February 1917, presidential suffrage passed both houses of the
Ohio legislature and was signed into law by the progressive Demo-
cratic governor, James A. Cox.231
Anti-suffragist petitions quickly began to circulate, calling for a
referendum on the new law.232 In the summer of 1917, as the United
States entered World War I, Allen was checking the petitions and
finding many fraudulent signatures easily identified by green ink
and similar handwriting.233 Allen and the women’s organizations
filed lawsuits in four counties to challenge the petitions, and the
courts threw out ninety percent of the signatures.234 However, the
Board of Elections in the sixty-five other counties with allegedly
fraudulent signatures refused to take action.235 The Ohio Supreme
Court declined to hear the case, and the referendum went forward.236
Opposition to women’s suffrage was bolstered by liquor interests
and animosity to the suffragists triggered by Alice Paul’s national
pickets of the White House during a time of war and subsequent
arrests.237 The referendum passed by a 144,000 majority, recalling
the legislative grant and retracting presidential suffrage for women.238
227. See DUBOIS, supra note 149, at 184–85.
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stitutional Amendments and Legislative Acts Before the Proclamation of the Nineteenth
Amendment, supra note 161, at 376–77 (including Texas (1918), Maine (1919), Missouri
(1919), Iowa (1919), Wisconsin (1919), Tennessee (1919), Kentucky (1919)).
229. See ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 50–51.
230. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 37.
231. See ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 51 (noting passage in the House 72 to
50 and in the Senate 20 to 16).
232. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 37.
233. Id. at 38; ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 51.
234. TUVE, supra note 1, at 43.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 57; Mikesell, supra note 165, at 57; see
also DORIS STEVENS, JAILED FOR FREEDOM 93, 211 (1920); Eileen L. McDonaugh & H.
Douglas Price, Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era: Patterns of Opposition and Support
in Referendum Voting, 1910–1918, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 415, 426–28 (1985).
238. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 43.
318 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:293
However, presidential suffrage was passed again in Ohio on June 16,
1919, by large majorities, the same day Ohio became the fifth state
to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment.239 Attempts by liquor interests
for a state referendum on federal constitutional amendments, upheld
by the Ohio Supreme Court, briefly threatened woman’s suffrage.240
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held definitively that there could
be no state public referendum on the ratification of a federal consti-
tutional amendment by the legislature.241 With Tennessee’s ratifica-
tion of the Susan B. Anthony Amendment on August 18, 1920,
women’s right to vote was included in the federal Constitution, and
state presidential suffrage became irrelevant.242
During these final years of the suffrage movement, Allen had
focused her efforts on practicing law.243 World War I also intervened,
halting many women’s suffrage efforts, including Allen’s, as she
switched to giving speeches to support the war effort.244 The war
also affected Allen in other ways, as her brother, Emir, was killed in
battle in 1918, and her other brother, Jack, a hot-air balloon surveyor
in the war, returned home severely injured and died soon after.245
Allen’s grief from the loss of her brothers to whom she was close
would be a driving force in her developing advocacy for peace and a
law against war.246 She would become an international speaker on
the outlawry of war and the use of legal instruments and treaties to
make war illegal.247
Looking back on her suffrage work many years later, Allen
observed: “To the young men and women of today with their free
companionship and equality of privilege, the subject of woman suf-
frage is as obsolete as a prehistoric animal.”248 She commented that
men and women now “buy cokes together, go to school together, plan
their homes together, spend and save their money together, keep
their checking accounts together, care for their babies together,
and—vote together.”249 “It is hard for them,” she noted, “to realize
that in the nineteenth century this free partnership was the rare
239. ALLEN & WELLES, supra note 163, at 52 (passing House 75 to 5 and Senate 27 to 3).
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and not the usual thing,” and that all had been changed by “univer-
sal suffrage with all of its ramifications.”250
III. AN INDEPENDENT, TOUGH JUDGE ON THE TRIAL COURT
As soon as women gained the right to vote upon ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, and were thus eligible for elec-
tive office, Florence Allen announced her candidacy for the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas.251 Allen had practiced in this court
as an assistant county prosecutor, primarily handling the Grand Jury
of criminal indictments, and was generally well regarded by colleagues
and jurors (although many of the retired police officers who were
common on the Grand Jury panel were not favorably inclined to the
“innovation [of] a woman in charge of the proceedings.”)252
Allen ran as an independent because she had missed the pri-
mary, which occurred prior to the enfranchisement of women as
voters and political candidates.253 She also explained that she ran as
independent because she disagreed with the Democrats’ position
endorsing the compulsory draft and she believed strongly in non-
partisan judges.254 In addition, she calculated, correctly, that women
of all parties would endorse her candidacy.255 Without the primary
or party, Allen had to secure the judicial nomination by petition just
two months before the election.256 The women’s suffrage machine
immediately came to her aid and engaged the campaign.257 In the
national election, which saw a Republican landslide when Ohio
Republican Warren Harding defeated Ohio Democratic Governor
James Cox for the presidency, the thirty-six-year-old Allen obtained
the largest number of votes for her office.258 She candidly admitted
her victory may have been due to “plunker votes” by which support-
ers voted only for her rather than the permissible four out of ten
candidates, thus reducing the other candidates’ total votes.259
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Despite this non-partisan stance, Florence Allen was clearly a
Democrat.260 In January 1920, while women were awaiting state
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, Allen discussed her po-
litical views with a newspaper writer in an article entitled “Why I
am a Democrat.”261 She said that she was a Democrat because she
believed a political party should exist to “render[] service to the peo-
ple.”262 Such service and humane progressive legislation, she ar-
gued, was achieved under Democratic President Woodrow Wilson in
laws on child welfare and women in industry—for the first time in
over forty years.263 For almost half a century, she chided, “one would
have thought that only men, and adult men at that, peopled Amer-
ica.”264 Allen also cited Wilson’s plan of international peace and the
pending League of Nations as a strong reason for her political af-
filiation.265 In addition, she noted the progressive Democratic mayor
of Cleveland, Tom Johnson, as a reason for her support.266 The
Democratic administration in Cleveland appointed Allen as a prose-
cutor, and a Democratic state representative introduced women’s
presidential suffrage in Ohio, supporting Allen and her views.267
Allen’s progressive values mirrored those of her parents, who
had worked for reforms of labor, education, and women’s rights, but
Allen now saw those progressive values as residing with the Demo-
crats, rather than the Republicans.268 This same shift would slowly
start to occur nationally beginning in 1920, as the Republicans
moved away from their role as reformers of the Progressive Era and
towards a party representing businesses and conservativism.269 The
majority of women, and men, however, were still strongly Republi-
can in 1920, in contrast to Allen’s position.270 It would not be until
the Democratic landslide of 1932 when social and moral reformers
would fully align with the Democratic Party.271 Allen’s former suf-
frage colleagues in NAWSA continued to endorse neutrality, reorga-
nizing into the non-partisan League of Women Voters after the
260. “Why I Am a Democrat” Discussed by Woman Lawyer, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 4,
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Florence Allen sworn in as a Common Pleas Judge for Cuyahoga
County (Jan. 1, 1921) (Kent State University Library, Ashtabula)
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment and continuing their biparti-
san efforts.272
When Florence Allen joined the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas
Court in 1921, it was a chaotic place of corruption and sensational-
ism.273 Political bribes, for patronage or favors, were the norm and the
era of Prohibition included corrupt police and Mafia involvement.274
Soap-opera-like cases were featured in the newspapers, and spectators
often filled the courtrooms.275 Allen ran on a platform of cleaning up
the courts, law enforcement and respect for law and order, “justice
for all,” moral standards in the court, and instilling “business meth-
ods” such as efficiency and expediency in the court.276 Attorneys
didn’t know what to make of a woman judge, and struggled with
whether to call her “Miss” or “Mrs.” or “Ma’am” or “Your Honor.”277
Allen insisted that they call her “Judge Allen.”278
During her eighteen months on the court, Allen prided herself
on clearing backlog, developing expertise among criminal judges,
and imposing judicial administration at the court.279 One key focus
of hers was to remedy the imprisonment of the complaining witness
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or victim during a criminal trial, an injustice she identified when
the defendant made bail, but the complainant was imprisoned for
their “protection.”280 Her solution was not to overturn the state stat-
ute or practice, but simply to expedite any case in which a witness
was being held.281 In another example of addressing delay, Allen
recommended continuing criminal trials over the summer, rather
than breaking for the usual summer delay, during which both de-
fendants and witnesses remained in jail.282 When the other eleven
judges on the court refused, she traded assignments with a judge on
the criminal court, rescheduled her vacation, and heard cases through-
out the summer.283
Allen heard both civil and criminal cases, though she seemed to
prefer the criminal cases based on her prosecutorial experience and
interests of justice.284 Initially, her judicial colleagues proposed cre-
ating a separate divorce court division and appointing her there.285
Allen adamantly refused this attempt to confine her to women’s or
family matters that were not a part of her platform or experience,
commenting that “[s]ince I was unmarried, I thought these eleven
men, most of them married, were better qualified than I to carry their
share of this burden.”286 A Cleveland News editorial quipped: “[w]e
certainly never expected to live long enough to hear a spinster decline
appointment as a judge of a court of marital relations on the ground
that she was ignorant of the subject.”287 During her eighteen months
on the court, Allen handled 892 cases, 579 with hearings, including
four murder trials.288 About 397 (or 44 percent) were divorce cases.289
Allen heard more divorce cases than any other two judges during
that same period, despite her reluctance to become a domestic rela-
tions specialist.290 She reconciled the couple in 101 of these cases,
saying that the divorce law was not too liberal or “evil,” but rather
that such cases needed to be pending longer to allow for reconcilia-
tion.291 Her advice for couples was not to enter into “hasty marriages,”
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provide for the wife to receive a regular allowance and be a “business
partner” to the husband, and for the wife to be “sympathetic” and
“never nag” her spouse.292
Allen’s other cases had a variety of weird factual contexts.293 In
one case, a Mrs. Miller, accused of murdering her husband, either
by mistaking him for a burglar or by premeditated threat, swooned
several times to avoid taking the stand and being subjected to cross
examination about her past.294 In another case, the defendant, accused
of assault with the intent to rob, was arrested on the doorstep of St.
Roses Catholic Church immediately after his own wedding.295 And in
another case, a defendant tried to avoid a new state statute mandating
minimum sentences by pleading guilty a day early, but discovered
the law did not apply to his misdemeanor charge of housebreaking.296
Allen sentenced him to the maximum under the law of $300 and six
months in the workhouse, telling him “you deserve it.”297 Women
served as jurors on many of Allen’s trials, newly eligible after the
Nineteenth Amendment and expressly authorized under the Ohio
constitution, unusual among states.298 Allen encouraged more women
to embrace this civic duty, and found that women were neither more
nor less emotional or intellectual than men.299 She did, however, adopt
the practice of sequestering men and women separately, employing
female bailiffs to supervise the women.300
Allen’s most notorious case as a trial judge was the case of “The
Black Hand.”301 Frank Motto, a gang leader who “terroriz[ed] men
and women . . . of Italian birth” was convicted of murdering two
business partners, then stealing the payroll funds they carried.302
292. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
293. See Notes from Testimony in Common Pleas Court 1921–22 (on file in Allen Papers,
Box 11, Folder 1).
294. See Woman Swoons at Murder Trial, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 16, 1921.
295. See Bride Hears Plea for Jailed Groom: Attorney Attacks Record of Detective Who
Broke Up Wedding Party, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 2, 1922.
296. Seeks Leniency, Gets the Limit (undated newspaper clipping) (on file in Allen
Papers).
297. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
298. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 56 (showing one example of Judge Allen’s cases with
female jurors); Burnita Shelton Matthews, The Woman Juror, 15 WOMEN LAWYERS J. 15,
15–16 (1927); TUVE, supra note 1, at 59.
299. See GRETCHEN RITTER, THE CONSTITUTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC
MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER100(2006);Joanna L. Grossman,
Note, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1115, 1154 (1994).
300. TUVE, supra note 1, at 59; see also ALLEN, supra note 7, at 59 (recounting an in-
stance of a female bailiff interacting with the female jurors).
301. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 55.
302. Id. at 55–56.
324 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:293
Judge Allen and members of the jury were threatened during the
trial, receiving a paper with the printed black outlines of a hand
saying “The day Motto dies, you die.”303 The jury convicted Motto,
and Allen imposed the death penalty as dictated by state law.304 She
was the first woman judge in the country to impose the death pen-
alty.305 Allen reported that she “did not enjoy this task.”306 Else-
where, she said was against capital punishment, but believed it was
her judicial duty to enforce the law.307 While the Motto case was being
appealed up the state courts, Allen moved with her friend to a new
apartment.308 When Allen traveled, her friend reported periodically
hearing someone around the house at night.309 When the women
later prepared to move out and emptied storage lockers in the base-
ment, they found a number of black hands outlining the walls.310
Judge Allen believed that her most important case as a trial
judge was the perjury trial of Judge McGannon.311 McGannon had
been the Chief Judge of the Cleveland Municipal Courts, but had
become involved with disreputable folks involved with bootlegging.312
A man was shot and killed in his car, but McGannon was acquitted
by two juries.313 It then came to light that witnesses had been bribed
and threatened, and jurors had been tampered with.314 Allen han-
dled the following trial for perjury in which a key witness revealed
that she had been paid to avoid testifying that she saw McGannon
at the car and with something in his hand.315 While the case was
pending, McGannon’s wife claimed that she would issue a statement
if her husband were found guilty, saying “I knew a few things in this
case that have never come out. If they convict my husband, an
innocent man, I will tell a few things.”316 Ohio’s law of spousal in-
competency at the time (and now) allowed a spouse to volunteer tes-
timony, but prevented the compelling of that testimony against her
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spouse.317 The state law of spousal incompetency allowed the spouse
against whom the testimony is offered to prohibit that testimony in
a criminal trial.318 Thus, it seems Judge McGannon did not want his
wife’s statement in court.319 Judge Allen sentenced McGannon to
jail, and standing from her podium, lectured him on the particular
wrongfulness of a judge, dedicated to upholding truth and justice,
lying in the courts of law.320
Allen reported that she was reversed only three times.321 One
of these cases was her decision holding attorney Tim Long in con-
tempt of court.322 Long, a former prosecutor whom Allen had worked
with, was defense counsel to a George Crawford who pled guilty to
embezzling $15,000.323 Crawford had no prior record, and Allen ini-
tially sentenced him to parole, and his wife sold some jewelry to
make partial restitution.324 Attorney Long then lied in court, saying
there was no other money in hiding, and that he had not received a
fee.325 In the contempt hearing before Judge Allen, it was established
that Crawford had deposited $5000 into a bank account with a ficti-
tious name, and given control of the account to Long as a legal fee.326
Allen sentenced Long to five days in jail for his contempt of lying to
the court, and revoked Crawford’s parole.327 The Ohio courts reversed,
finding that Judge Allen improperly imposed summary contempt.328
Allen had thought her contempt penalty appropriate because the
conduct occurred in front of her in court, but she acknowledged in
her autobiography that she came to see the importance of restraint in
issuing contempt because the judge personally feels the injury and
may not have the usual objective distance to render judgment.329
Years later, Judge Allen noted that her eleven colleagues on the
Court of Common Pleas granted her “every consideration,” and offered
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319. See Judge Is To Testify, supra note 316, at 1.
320. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 62.
321. Id. at 52.
322. See Long Given 5 Days in Contempt Case, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 3, 1921.
323. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 53; see also Long Given 5 Days in Contempt Case,
supra note 322.
324. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 53.
325. See Long Given 5 Days in Contempt Case, supra note 322.
326. See id.
327. Id.
328. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 54.
329. See id.
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her “friendship and cooperation.”330 That would not, however, be the
case for the higher courts on which she would serve.331
IV. MODERATION ON THE OHIO SUPREME COURT
Allen was elected to the Supreme Court in 1922, one of two
judges (as they were then called).332 Allen was the lone Democrat on
the court and would remain so for most of her two terms of service.333
Allen had run again as a non-partisan candidate via petition; neither
party supported her.334 The women of Ohio, however, did, as women
of both parties voting as a united block secured her election in 1922
to one of two open seats on the Supreme Court of seven.335 Susan
Rebhan, a teacher and principal from Youngstown, field secretary for
the YWCA, and later Allen’s close friend, served as campaign man-
ager.336 “Florence Allen clubs” formed all over the state using suf-
frage networks helped publicize her campaign based on the same
platform she had for the common pleas court, emphasizing “politics
should have no connection with the courts.”337 Allen’s physical appear-
ance proved to be an asset, as her “hearty” physical size, outdated
hairstyle, common sense shoes, and a voice with “masculine depth”
suggested seriousness and strength of body and mind, and negated
the stereotype of women as frail, flighty, and fashion focused.338
330. Id. at 52.
331. See id. at 79 (explaining the reaction of the other judges on Judge Allen’s first day).
332. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 67; Florence Ellinwood Allen, supra note 2. An Ohio
Supreme Court jurist was called “Judge” prior to 1968 when a joint resolution amended
the state Constitution to change the title to “Justice.” See H.J.R. No. 42, 107th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1968) (amending Art. IV, sec. 2).
333. The Court had shifted from majority Democrat in 1913 (five of seven justices) to the
majority Republican by 1919, with only one Democrat by 1921, and would remain so until
it began to shift back again after the Democratic sweep of 1932 and by 1934 had become
majority Democrat (five of seven justices). See Justices by Term Since 1913, THE SUP.CT.
OFOHIO, https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/terms.asp [https://perma
.cc/XRT4-4892]; see also Justices of the Supreme Court of Ohio 1803 to Present, THE SUP.
CT. OF OHIO, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/default.asp [http://
perma.cc/MZX3-2P9V].
334. TUVE, supra note 1, at 63, 65.
335. See Cleveland Woman Judge Elected to Supreme Bench, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH,
Nov. 10, 1922, at 1 (“[S]he had the support of the majority of the women.”). Mary Grossman
was also elected to the Cleveland Municipal Court, scandalized by the McGannon case.
TUVE, supra note 1, at 73 n.14.
336. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 65.
337. See id. at 50.
338. See TUVE,supra note 1, at 65 (citing undated newspaper clipping in Allen Papers,
Box 26, Folder 6).
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Judge Florence Allen, Ohio Supreme Court (1923)
The resulting press celebrating Allen’s successful election as the
first woman in the country elected to a Supreme Court was a “veri-
table love feast,” applauding her historical feat, underscoring her
qualifications, and labeling her a “women’s woman.”339 However, at
least one naysayer, the former mayor of Cincinnati, Edward Dempsey,
protested her election, arguing that the results should not be certi-
fied because the Nineteenth Amendment gave women only the right
to vote, not the right to hold public office.340 Once certified, Allen
moved to Columbus, bought a big old house close to the courthouse,
and her parents, sister Esther Gaw, now a single mom and Dean of
Women Students at Ohio State University, brother Jack (before his
death), and friend Susan moved in.341
The six male judges on the Ohio Supreme Court did not know
what to do with a female colleague. Allen noted graciously that
“[t]here always is an adjustment when a new member enters a
court[,]” and that was magnified by her gender.342 She recounted
how on the first day she heard cases and the judges retired to delib-
eration in the conference room, she “was aware of a certain uneasi-
ness among the men[.]”343 She said to them, “[w]hile I don’t smoke,
myself . . . I shall be delighted if any of you will do so whenever he
wishes[,]” to which they replied by lighting up pipes and cigars.344
Allen recalled that one fellow judge, James Robinson, was particu-
larly opposed to her and to women generally in professional life,
339. Id. at 66–67.
340. See id. at 66. Several states like Iowa and Oklahoma did still prohibit women
from holding public office. Id. at 73 n.16.
341. See id. at 78–80.
342. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 79.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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though Allen said they eventually became friends.345 Even eight
years later her colleagues didn’t know what to make of her. When
Allen cut her outdated long hair, worn in figure-eight top knot, into
a very short style, one of her fellow judges told her she looked like
a football player.346 Her haircut received media interest, with the
newspaper commenting that although Judge Allen had long defied
the trend of the “bobbed hair epidemic,” she returned from summer
vacation having “cast aside the long chestnut-colored tresses.”347 The
paper reported that her male colleagues were surprised, but re-
frained from comment, as “there was no statutory law on the subject
of how a woman should wear her hair.”348
Allen took the bench during a time when the type of cases
appearing before the Supreme Court was quickly changing. Gone
were the days of what she called “run-of-the-mine . . . case[s]” of
private disputes or criminal prosecutions.349 Instead, as Allen noted,
“the Ohio courts were now entering new and unexplored domains of
the law.”350 Progressive legislation of the early century and sweeping
changes in Ohio’s new 1912 state constitution triggered new dis-
putes of original interpretation about the scope of governmental
power and populist access to power.351 Industrialization of steel and
rubber, and the growth of the transportation and automobile indus-
tries all provided new sources of legal disputes and questions.352
Allen summarized her twelve years of jurisprudence on the
Ohio Supreme Court as falling into six categories of cases: schools,
municipal power, labor, taxes, jury questions (miscellaneous factual
disputes), and worker’s compensation.353 But at the heart of her
jurisprudence, particularly in those opinions she authored, Allen
was concerned generally with public law and the constitutionally of
progressive legislation and governmental regulation.354 In her first
345. See id. Robinson was a Republican and a former county prosecutor and would
become great-grandfather to President George W. Bush. See Daniel Nasaw, The Bush
Family Tree: Five Generations of an American Dynasty, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2015), http://
graphics.wsj.com/jeb-bush-family-tree [https://perma.cc/5J5K-797X].
346. See Florence Allen, Diary, Oct. 1, 1929.
347. Bobbed Locks Finally Win Judge Allen, Dec. 22, 1929 (on file with author).
348. Id.
349. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 80.
350. Id.
351. See id. at 80–81; TUVE, supra note 1, at 92.
352. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 80.
353. See id. at 82–85.
354. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bowman v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Allen Cnty., 177 N.E. 271, 280
(Ohio 1931) (Allen, J., dissenting after hearing), appeal dismissed sub nom. Allen Cnty.
v. Ohio, 286 U.S. 526 (1932); City of Cuyahoga Falls. v. Beck, 143 N.E. 661, 667 (Ohio 1924)
(holding for city because taxpayers delayed too long in challenging sewer system and
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cases, Allen upheld Cleveland’s new city manager plan against con-
stitutional challenge.355 The plan by which a city manager was hired
by a city council elected by proportional representation had been
strongly advocated by Allen and women’s organizations like the
League of Women Voters as a way to address corruption in govern-
ment and efficiency over politicking.356 Allen’s opinion was one of the
first judicial decisions in the United States to uphold that form of
municipal power, and hailed as the first supreme court decision
written by a woman.357 The plan, however, was repealed in 1931,
strongly opposed by both political parties.358 In another important
decision on power, Pritz v. Messer, Allen wrote the opinion uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the zoning power under the home-rule
provision and within the police power to protect the public morals,
health, and safety.359 The United States Supreme Court held simi-
larly three years later in the seminal case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., but Allen had already recognized and articulated the
validity of zoning laws as an exercise of police power.360
Allen also earned a reputation for her pro-labor decisions. She
upheld the lawfulness of labor picketing, at least when unaccompa-
nied by physical violence.361 She supported the worker in several
worker’s compensation cases, upholding the general system but also
allowing an injured employee to circumvent the compensation to sue
expense); Fisher Bros. Co. v. Brown, 146 N.E. 100, 108 (Ohio 1924) (validating constitution-
ality of taxation of commercial trucks by horsepower); State ex rel. Ret. Bd. of State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Kurtz, 144 N.E. 120, 123–24 (Ohio 1924) (upholding law creating
retirement fund for state teachers); Miller v. Korns, 144 N.E. 773, 776 (Ohio 1923) (up-
holding inter-district spending of school funds as constitutional); State ex rel. Masters v.
Beamer, 141 N.E. 851, 857 (Ohio 1923) (requiring county to provide public transportation
for public school students); see also ALLEN, supra note 7, at 84, 90–91 (discussing a case
upholding municipalities’ power to establish utilities and power plants, and explaining
the changes to State ex rel. Bowman v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Allen Cnty. Allen wrote the
original opinion in the case, finding that county grossly abused its power by establishing
a sewer system at taxpayer expense, but after rehearing sought by “every financial indus-
try in the state,” she ended up in dissent.); Florence Allen, The Living Power of the Law,
Address to the Judicial Section of the Ohio State Bar Association (July 6, 1928) (on file
in Allen Papers).
355. See Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 141 N.E. 27, 34 (Ohio 1923); Hile v. City of
Cleveland, 141 N.E. 35, 37–38 (Ohio 1923), writ of error dismissed, 266 U.S. 582 (1924).
356. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 92–93.
357. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 81–82.
358. See id. at 81; TUVE, supra note 1, at 92.
359. See Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30, 35 (Ohio 1925). But see City of Youngstown v.
Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 845–46 (Ohio 1925) (invalidating zoning restriction
prohibiting apartment building near private homes).
360. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926); Pritz, 149
N.E. at 35.
361. See LaFrance Elec. & Supply Co. v. Int’l Brother Elec. Workers, 140 N.E. 899, 908
(Ohio 1923).
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for damages.362 These views mirrored that of her father, who had
worked as a state legislator in Utah to pass a worker’s compensation
statute.363 Allen’s decisions earned her the support of labor, which
publicly endorsed her in her judicial re-election campaigning.364 But
they also quickly cost her the support of labor in later nominations,
when in a subsequent decision, she took the position against labor
and voted to uphold a state building contract given to a non-union
company.365 Allen’s moderate decision making aggravated labor
supporters who expected universal sympathy for union workers.366
Judge Allen had many random and funny cases as well. Cases
including those of runaway horses on a highway, baseball foul ball
injuries, and a wife suing a mistress for alienation of affection.367
The alienation case was found to be of public interest for Allen’s
concurring opinion limiting the scope of the restraining order against
the mistress due to difficulty of enforcement.368 Allen noted that
“this opinion was extensively quoted by professors in law schools
throughout the country[,]” as “[t]he combination of the interesting case
and of a woman judge delivering herself of outspoken views as to how
to handle a triangle was too much for the law professors to resist.”369
During her first term on the court, Allen took a detour and ran
for Senate in 1926 on a platform of peace.370 She had become a strong
advocate for the “Outlawry of War,” a peace movement focused on
making aggressive war illegal by treaty or other international law.371
Allen was not a pacifist, supporting both defensive and liberation
362. See Indus. Comm’n. v. Polcen, 169 N.E. 305, 306 (Ohio 1929); Ohio Automatic
Sprinkler Co. v. Fender, 141 N.E. 269, 277 (Ohio 1923) (reversing past cases by a vote
of four to three).
363. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 80.
364. See, e.g., id. at 85 (explaining a worker’s compensation case); see also Landever,
supra note 19, at 31–32.
365. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 109; State ex rel. United Dist. Heating, Inc. v. State
Office Bldg. Comm’n, 181 N.E. 129, 129 (Ohio 1932) (upholding the contract to a non-
union company).
366. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 109.
367. See Drew v. Gross, 147 N.E. 757, 757 (Ohio 1925); Cincinnati Baseball Co. v. Eno,
147 N.E. 86, 87 (Ohio 1925); Snedaker v. King, 145 N.E. 15, 16–17 (Ohio 1934).
368. See Snedaker, 145 N.E. at 17 (Allen, J., concurring).
369. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 87.
370. See id. at 76–77.
371. For an overview of Judge Allen’s views on the international peace movement, see
id. at 74–78; TUVE, supra note 1, at 67–72; Florence E. Allen, Peace Through Justice, 35
WOMEN LAWYERS J. 6, 6–8, 36 (1949) (discussing the tragedy of World War II and the
best methods for achieving peace); Florence E. Allen, Address Before National Business
and Professional Women (July 1946) (on file in Allen Papers, Box 15, Folder 3). For a
background on outlawing war through treaties, see for example OONA A. HATHAWAY &
SCOTT J.SHAPIRO,THEINTERNATIONALISTS:HOW A RADICALPLAN TO OUTLAWWARREMADE
THE WORLD xiii (2017) (arguing that the Kellogg-Briand Treaty to outlaw war was a
transformational movement in international relations).
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wars.372 But losing both of her brothers in World War I triggered a
lifelong commitment to peace efforts, and she spoke often on the radio,
to church congregations, and to women’s and peace conventions on
the topic.373 Her sincere and inspirational oratory had a “ministerial
aura” to it, infused with Biblical references and personal daily para-
bles.374 Allen believed that she could do more for change from the
Senate, where she could make laws, rather than simply interpret
them, and where she could engage on a broad international level.375
Allen initially received Democratic Party support, but when the
past candidate, Atlee Pomerene, then the prosecutor of the Teapot
Dome Scandal in Washington, stepped back in, the party dropped
its support of Allen in favor of Pomerene.376 Allen had campaigned
after work and during her lunch hour, gave speeches at dinners,
toured the state in her Model T car named “Gypsy,” and studied court
briefs until four in the morning, all while arriving each day at the
court by seven.377 The unions strongly endorsed her.378 “Labor is sup-
porting [Judge Allen],” they said, “because she is comparably the best
and biggest man available for the job. In brains, character and experi-
ence, she towers head and shoulders above the field.”379 The Railway
Labor Organization supported Allen because of her “progressive
views and humane tendencies,” and because of her record on the
bench showing her “eminently fair to the interests of all classes,
including labor.”380 These endorsements and Allen’s hard work and
determinism, however, were not enough. The voters were no longer
engaged by peace efforts, as eight years after the war they sought
isolationism and distance from the past loss, and caused some to label
Allen a “red,” associating her with socialism and anti-patriotic
action.381 Pomerene won the primary, but lost the general election.382
In commenting that Ohio had lost the opportunity to be the first
state to have a woman U.S. Senator, The Evening Star national
newspaper noted that, while the hopes of women across the country
had “gone a-glimmering,” Allen had no real chance to defeat the
372. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 70.
373. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 73–74.
374. TUVE, supra note 1, at 71–72.
375. See id. at 75.
376. See id. at 75–76.
377. See id. at 75, 80–81.
378. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 77.
379. Id.
380. Official Endorsement of Judge Florence E. Allen for United States Senator by Rail-
way Labor Organization (July 27, 1926) (citing the LaFrance decision upholding the right
of labor to picket and the Ohio Automatic Sprinkler case enforcing occupational safety).
381. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 85; Florence Allen, Diary, Mar. 21, 1926.
382. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 78.
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Republican candidate, though the “race would have been pictur-
esque, . . . with the feminist element interjected.”383
After her defeat for the Senate, Allen ran again for a second
term on the Ohio Supreme Court.384 This campaign was easy, as
Allen had demonstrated her qualifications, and had gained accep-
tance as a serious, smart, and careful judge.385 Democrats and labor
supported her candidacy, endorsing her because of her national
reputation, experience, and progressive views.386 Ministerial associa-
tions and the press also strongly supported her.387 For the first time,
women’s groups were less instrumental, as women’s clubs moved
away from social causes to personal pleasures like lunch, bridge,
and fashion.388
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) supported Allen’s second campaign as well.389 It endorsed
her because she was the only judicial candidate who was a member
of the organization.390 The NAACP also supported her because of her
vote on several judicial decisions, including one holding that it was
lawful for a board of education to prohibit showing the controversial
film “‘The Birth of a Nation’ because of its racism, and two others
opposing school segregation.”391
However, a later case regarding university segregation during
Allen’s second term alienated the NAACP, which then subsequently
opposed her nomination to the federal court.392 In Weaver v. Board
383. Pomerene Leading Florence E. Allen, EVENING STAR, Aug. 11, 1926, at 8.
384. TUVE, supra note 1, at 86.
385. See id. at 87.
386. See Letter from D.B. Robertson, President, Brotherhood Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen to All Members of B.L.F.&E. Residing in the State of Ohio (Oct. 17, 1928) (on
file in Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder 3).
387. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 87, 105.
388. See id. at 84–85.
389. Id. at 87.
390. Id.
391. Id.; see Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Dayton v. State ex rel. Reese, 151 N.E. 39, 39
(Ohio 1926) (per curiam). In Reese, the Dayton School Board established separate class-
rooms for black children in mixed schools in 1912, a practice it had used in the nineteenth
century, and then in 1918, assigned all black children at one school to a separate annex
behind the main school building where white students attended. Id. Dayton ignored the
Ohio Supreme Court’s court decree finding it illegal, and school segregation battles
continued there for fifty years, culminating in a U.S. Supreme Court case on the appro-
priate scope of a desegregation remedy. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.
526, 534 (1979), aff’g, Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 249 (6th Cir. 1978).
392. See State ex rel. Weaver v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, 185 N.E. 196,
199 (Ohio 1933); Letter from Clayborne George, Legal Defense Committee of the Cleveland
NAACP to Senator Robert Bulkley (Feb. 12, 1934) (on file in Allen Papers, Box 6, Folder
5) [hereinafter Letter from Clayborne George to Senator Robert Bulkley]; Letter from
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of Trustees, a Black college student, Doris Weaver, sued Ohio State
University for racial segregation in the housing component of her
college clinical experience.393 Home economics majors like Weaver
lived in a house with a student roommate.394 When no other student
elected to live with Weaver, she was assigned to live with a white
instructor in an adjacent house, rather than the main house.395 The
Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was unanimous in holding that dis-
crimination laws could not reach social, intimate relations such as
a roommate.396 By 1933, the Court had three Democrats, including
a Chief Justice.397 The decision had been per curiam, but the NAACP
still excoriated Allen for her passive acceptance of the decision and
her refusal to dissent.398 “We believe that by this opinion, an opinion
reeking and pregnant with racial discrimination, Judge Allen and
her associates disbarred themselves from any further judicial consid-
eration.”399 Allen defended the decision on the facts in a response to
the NAACP, and said she would “vote exactly the same,” and that
the decision was color blind as the “[same decision] would have been
rendered in the case of any white girl.”400 Decades later, Allen was
still sensitive to the criticism of the case, and seemed to justify her
decision by recounting in her autobiography the story of a Black
friend from college, Mary Brown, who commented to Allen that she
would not have brought such a lawsuit like Doris Weaver, but would
have instead continued her studies to make the way easier for the
next Black woman’s success.401
By 1932, Allen was frustrated with the Ohio Supreme Court.402
She was “sick of the intolerable situation” and “arbitrary justice”
arising from the control of the assignment of cases by Chief Justice
Florence E. Allen to Walter White, Secretary of the NAACP (Mar. 22, 1934) (on file in Allen
Papers, Box 6, Folder 5) [hereinafter Letter from Florence E. Allen to Walter White].
393. See Weaver, 185 N.E. at 197.
394. See id.
395. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 91.
396. Weaver, 185 N.E. at 199.
397. See Will Prettyman Stephenson, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO & THE OHIO JUD. SYS.,
https://www.sconet.state.oh.us/SCO/formerjustices/bios/stephenson.asp [https://perma.cc
/NY7N-YUF6]; Carl Victor Weygandt, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO & THE OHIO JUD. SYS.,
https://www.sconet.state.oh.us/SCO/formerjustices/bios/Weygandt.asp [https://
perma.cc/PL2Q-EBA6]; Charles Ballard Zimmerman, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO & THE OHIO
JUD.SYS., https://www.sconet.state.oh.us/SCO/formerjustices/bios/zimmerman.asp [https://
perma.cc/96VS-J3AJ].
398. See Letter from Clayborne George to Senator Robert Bulkley, supra note 392.
399. Id.
400. See Letter from Florence E. Allen to Walter White, supra note 392.
401. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 92.
402. TUVE, supra note 1, at 103.
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Carrington Marshall.403 Marshall had been elected Chief Justice in
1920, and served until 1932 during most of Allen’s tenure.404 Marshall
was a Republican, fifteen years Allen’s senior, who had thirty years
of general office practice as a lawyer.405 Allen had angered Marshall
by calling him out in an opinion she wrote in a case involving the
mishandling of school funds.406 She challenged Marshall’s social and
business ties to the case and endorsed the parties’ request for re-
cusal.407 In the opinion, Allen, and the other justices, criticized
Marshall for setting himself on a pedestal and assigning cases so
that opinions reflected his own personal views.408
Due to her frustration with the politics of the court and the lack
of transparency, Allen again ran for legislative office, this time for
the House of Representatives.409 She sought to capitalize on her
popularity resulting from her 1928 judicial re-election in which she
had won by a good margin even during a heavily Republican year.410
As before, Allen also sought a larger platform on which to engage on
the political and social issues of the day.411 While women and labor
continued to endorse her, this time the press came out in opposition,
preferring that she remain in the judiciary and criticizing her for
abandoning her judicial duties and campaigning while on judicial
salary.412 The issues chose her, with the repeal of prohibition and
economic solutions to the Great Depression being the main discus-
sion.413 Allen offered little on these issues, being an avid supporter
of Prohibition, she now weakly claimed she would support whatever
the voters wanted, losing her the endorsement of an old suffrage
ally, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU).414 Allen
lost the 1932 election to a Republican, despite the Democratic land-
slide nationwide electing Franklin D. Roosevelt president.415 But her
403. Id. at 103, 108; see also Florence Allen, Diary, Dec. 10, 1932.
404. See Michael Meckler, Forgotten Ohio Chief Justice Died 60 Years Ago Today,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 28, 2018), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20180628/forgot
ten-ohio-chief-justice-died-60-years-ago-today [http://perma.cc/S7DU-Y7DX]; see also
Carrington Tanner Marshall, THE SUP. CT. OF OHIO & THE OHIO JUD. SYS., https://www.su
premecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/formerjustices/bios/marshall.asp [http://perma.cc/7EW9-RYB8].
405. See Carrington Tanner Marshall, supra note 404.
406. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 88–90 (citing State ex rel. Turner v. Marshall, 176
N.E. 454, 455 (Ohio 1931)).
407. See Turner, 176 N.E. at 455.
408. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 99.
409. See id. at 103.
410. See id.
411. See id. at 104–05.
412. See id. at 105–06.
413. See id. at 103.
414. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 104.
415. See id. at 106.
2021] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FIRST WOMAN JUDGE 335
Judge John Gore, Judge Florence Allen, and Judge John Martin
sitting in the TVA case, Chattanooga, Tennessee (1937)
candidacy put her on the national radar for another political ap-
pointment to federal court.416
V. A CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL ON THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT
President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Florence Allen to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on March 23,
1934—her fiftieth birthday.417 That same day, her fellow Ohio judicial
colleagues gave her a surprise birthday cake, perhaps representing
some acceptance of her into their ranks.418 Allen became one of four
judges then serving on the Sixth Circuit, one from each state in the
circuit—Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee and Kentucky.419 She would
serve for twenty-five years on the federal bench, the last year as Chief
Justice, becoming the first woman jurist to serve in this position.420
The federal appointment resulted, as before, from the active
support and campaigning of national women’s groups, bolstered by
her strong political connections in Washington, D.C.421 These in-
cluded Attorney General Homer Cummings for whom Allen had
worked campaigning for President Wilson in the West, and Judge
416. See id.
417. Howard, supra note 9; TUVE, supra note 1, at 110.
418. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 110.
419. See M. Neil Reed, Tom Vanderloo & Stephanie Woebkenberg, A History of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, FED. LAW., Aug 2016, at 34, 36. The
Sixth Circuit had only three judgeships for decades, but increased to four in 1928, six by
1940, and currently sixteen. Id.
420. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 111; Reed et al., supra note 419, at 36.
421. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 107–08.
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Harold Stephens, a lifelong friend from Utah.422 Former U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice John Clarke wrote in support: “As the daughter
of my college classmate I have had an especial interest in Judge
Florence Allen . . . . I think her opinions equal if not superior to any
others coming from the Ohio Supreme Court in recent years. You
know of course of her thorough education and judicial methods.”423
Judge Will Stephenson, a colleague on the Ohio Supreme Court
said, “There is no Court too big for Judge Allen.”424 Activism from
the women’s division of the Democratic Party and support from First
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt all converged to create the right political
circumstances for the appointment of a woman.425
Opposition, however, came from former friends and allies. The
NAACP strongly opposed her nomination over her vote in the Weaver
race discrimination case.426 Some labor groups dropped their support
of Allen because of her inconsistent and sometimes moderate deci-
sions in union cases.427 The FBI background report prepared at the
time of Allen’s nomination revealed that
[a] large minority of prominent members [of the] Cleveland Bar
and U.S. District Judges [redacted] strongly oppose appointment,
alleging applicant is not qualified to hear [cases which] involved
patent, tax, admiralty and other matters before Circuit Court
and has no knowledge of Federal practice and is untrained,
unethical and politically ambitious with aspirations to U.S. Su-
preme Court.428
The report continued that “[m]any members term her appointment as
lamentable, laughable, disastrous and would make the Circuit Court
appear ridiculous and would lower the high traditions of that bench,”
although it noted that “[m]any members admit a natural prejudice
against women in the judiciary, particularly Federal, as being natu-
rally unqualified.”429 The report, however, also observed that “[s]ome
members of Cleveland Bar favor her appointment alleging able, fair,
422. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 93; TUVE, supra note 1, at 110.
423. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 94.
424. Id. at 95.
425. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 110.
426. Id. at 109; see also Organ, supra note 92, at 167–69. Allen’s suffrage colleague,
Black lawyer Jane Hunter, wrote to Allen with her support and apologizing for the NAACP
men. Organ, supra note 92, at 168.
427. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 109.
428. Clark, supra note 12, at 499 (quoting Memorandum Prepared for Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation by F.A. Tamm (Feb. 15, 1939)).
429. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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independent, conscientious, judicious, legal mind and well qualified
in every respect.”430
President Roosevelt proceeded with the nomination, and the
Senate confirmed her unanimously, although “without enthusiasm.”431
Dinners and banquets were held in her honor, recognizing this his-
toric accomplishment of a woman on the federal appellate court.432
Her nomination, however, would prove to be an isolated event rather
than a trend.433 Allen herself reflected years later that she thought
Roosevelt may have appointed her only for “shock effect.”434
Allen’s colleagues on the federal court were unwelcoming and
exclusionary.435 Allen recounted that she was told that when her ap-
pointment was announced, one judge “went to bed for two days.”436
Judge Xenophon Hicks refused to write her a polite congratulatory
note, and avoided looking at her during their first working sessions,
signaling his strong opposition to women on the bench.437 When sitting
as a group for argument in Cincinnati, the male judges took lunch at
the University Club and other establishments that excluded women,
while Allen walked during lunch “to get rid of the stuffiness.”438 Her
male colleagues criticized her work, Allen thought unfairly, being
overly critical on trivial matters and sending her “mean letters.”439
Allen worked hard to prove herself.440 She knew none of her
colleagues wanted a woman on the court, but thought that if she
work conscientiously, as she had in the past, that she could change
that initial reaction.441 In her first session on the court, she “asked
one or two pertinent questions, and in the conference after the cases
I expressed myself in the normal way,” but otherwise did not assert
herself except to vote.442 Early in her tenure, she fell down a flight of
stairs at the courthouse, landing on her face and breaking several
teeth and battering her face.443 When the presiding judge, Charles
Moorman, moved to postpone the case scheduled for the next day, a
big Detroit bank case involving a number of lawyers already on the
430. Id.
431. TUVE, supra note 1, at 110 (internal quotations omitted).
432. See id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 111 (internal quotations omitted).
435. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 95.
436. Id.
437. See id. at 95, 97.
438. TUVE, supra note 1, at 116 (internal quotations omitted).
439. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
440. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 96.
441. See id. at 95–96.
442. Id. at 97.
443. Id. at 97–98.
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trains headed for Cincinnati, Allen refused to postpone.444 Sensitive
to the expense during this latter part of the Depression, Allen con-
tinued the case despite how she looked, with her face bandaged and
wrapped in adhesive tape.445 Her fortitude in carrying on, even with
a bandaged face, won over Judge Hicks a bit, and they were able to
work together on the court.446
Allen handled a variety of cases typical of a federal appellate
court at the time.447 These included a heavy docket of labor cases
after the adoption of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 man-
dating fair collective bargaining practices, and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 establishing a minimum wage, maximum hours,
and no child labor.448 Allen’s decisions went both ways on these cases,
ruling sometimes for labor, sometimes for management.449 She heard
a consumer case from the Federal Trade Commission regarding
misleading statements about a quack medicine called “Glyoxylide,”
a case challenging the illegal seizure of a liquor sill during Prohibition,
a case where a defendant coerced a young man not to register for the
draft, a civil suit for malicious prosecution against a witness in an
oil property case, and a case about a fraudulent housing loan.450 She
struggled with an opinion she wrote upholding the denaturalization
of a woman alleged to be a communist, focusing on the defendant’s
444. See id. at 98.
445. See id.
446. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 98.
447. See, e.g., Niepert v. Cleveland Illuminating Co., 241 F.2d 916, 916–17 (6th Cir.
1957) (negligence boat pier); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97, 101–02 (6th Cir. 1956)
(narcotics); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 820 (6th
Cir. 1953) (government contracts); Deupree v. Levinson, 186 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir.
1950) (admiralty).
448. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69; Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206–07.
449. Compare NLRB v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 170 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir. 1948) (for labor up-
holding NLRB); NLRB v. Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F.2d 80, 86 (6th Cir. 1946) (for union
holding foremen are employees eligible for bargaining unit); NLRB v. Salant & Salant, Inc.,
183 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 1950) (for union upholding NLRB that company failed to bar-
gain in good faith); Emulsified Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Mitchell, 222 F.2d 913, 914 (6th Cir.
1955) (for labor holding company must comply with FLSA), with NLRB v. Bill Daniels,
Inc., 202 F.2d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 1953) (for management holding car agencies need not
comply with FLSA); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 731, 742 (6th Cir. 1950) (for
management holding no evidence employee fired for union activity); Ohio Power Co. v.
NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 386 (6th Cir. 1949) (for management holding supervisors are not
eligible employees for bargaining unit); Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800,
805–06 (6th Cir. 1940) (for management reversing NLRB).
450. See ALLEN, supra note 7, at 99–101; see also Koch v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 206
F.2d 311, 314 (6th Cir. 1953) (misleading drug advertisements); Cardinal v. United States,
79 F.2d 825, 826 (6th Cir. 1935) (liquor still); Devine v. Patteson, 242 F.2d 828, 829 (6th
Cir. 1957) (witness case), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957).
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contempt of court and refusal to answer questions.451 And she heard
“innumerable tax cases.”452
Judge Allen also heard a number of patent cases, in days before
the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals that since 1982
has heard all patent appeals.453 Patent cases were prevalent in the
Sixth Circuit, which covered the automotive, steel, and machine tool
industries that “w[ere] alive with patent activity.”454 Allen’s first
written opinion on the Sixth Circuit was in a patent case, where she
dissented from the finding of patent invalidity.455 Allen’s clear
opinion, relying on extensive precedent, found that invention suffi-
cient to establish the validity of the patent for an oil refining still.456
Despite this first case, Allen noticed that she was not being assigned
to sit on any patent cases.457 She requested the assignment from
Judge Moorman, who balked, until Allen explained she was not
requesting any special case, but rather to not be excluded from any
class of cases.458 She emphasized that she had the experience neces-
sary to hear such cases, citing her father’s work as a manager of the
silver mines, and her familiarity with industrial situations from her
Ohio court days.459 After that, Allen reported, she “wrote many
opinions in patent cases, a number of which the Supreme Court
affirmed or refused to review.”460 After 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court
451. See Brown v. United States, 234 F.2d 140, 141–42 (6th Cir. 1956).
452. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 101; see Wexler v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 241 F.2d
304, 304 (6th Cir. 1957) (taxing profits for horse race betting), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 938
(1957); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 230 F.2d 585, 586 (6th Cir.
1956) (taxing auto club income as commercial not recreational activity), aff’d, 353 U.S.
180 (1957); Rogers v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 111 F.2d 987, 988 (6th Cir. 1940) (tax
penalties); McInerney v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 82 F.2d 665, 665–66 (6th Cir. 1936);
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 81 F.2d 971, 972 (6th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 676 (1936); Miller v. Hocking Glass Co., 80 F.2d 436, 436 (6th Cir.
1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 659 (1936).
453. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 157; see also John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the
Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 276 (2002).
454. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 102.
455. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539–41 (6th Cir.
1934) (Allen, J., dissenting).
456. Id.
457. ALLEN, supra note 7, at 102.
458. Id.
459. See id. at 102–03.
460. Id. at 103; see, e.g., Nat’l Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 274 F.2d 224, 228
(6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 989 (1960); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Republic Steel
Corp., 233 F.2d 828, 831 (6th Cir. 1956) (upholding validity of patents for rolling steel into
thin strips), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956); Great Lakes Equip. Co. v. Fluid Sys., 217
F.2d 613, 614 (6th Cir. 1954) (upholding validity and infringement of patent for system
for electronically heating fluid); Am. Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 472, 473
(6th Cir. 1942); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Swan Carburetor Co., 88 F.2d 876, 878 (6th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 691 (1937), rehear’g denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937) (patent
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declined to hear most patent cases, leaving the appellate courts and
decisions like Allen’s as the final word on patent law.461 Patent
lawyers were “aghast” when Allen was first appointed to the federal
court, but quickly did “an about face and were among her most con-
spicuous advocates” appreciating her expertise.462 Potter Stewart,
future Supreme Court Justice who sat on the Sixth Circuit with Allen
from 1954 to 1958, used Allen’s opinions as research and learned
patent law from her.463
Early in her federal career, Judge Allen had the opportunity to
decide one of the few cases that would come before her implicating
women’s rights. The case Walker v. Chapman challenged the consti-
tutionality of Ohio’s minimum wage law for women.464 A federal
statute required a three-judge court at the district level to hear any
case which sought to enjoin a state law; Allen was the circuit judge
joined by two district judges.465 The final decision in Walker was
designated per curiam, but the writing clearly reflects Allen’s style,
intellect, and moderated reasoning.466 Walker seemed to be an easy
case of striking down Ohio’s wage law for women, as the U.S. Su-
preme Court had expressly invalidated such protective laws for
women in the 1923 case, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.467 The Court
held in Adkins that the Nineteenth Amendment represented a struc-
tural change of all protective laws for women, not just voting, and
thus mandated equality of treatment in wage legislation.468 The
Court affirmed that holding a few months before Walker, in a 5-4
split decision in Morehead v. New York.469 Allen, however, carefully
following the clues laid out in Morehead, adopted the key argument
of Chief Justice Hughes’ dissent: that the D.C. wage legislation in
Adkins could be distinguished from the legislative standard in the
infringement); see also Florence E. Allen, Invention American Style, 40 J.PAT.OFF.SOC’Y
312, 318 (1958).
461. See Duffy, supra note 453, at 273, 291–96 (2002) (suggesting the mid-century
decline in hearing patent cases may be in part attributable to 1952 Patent Act); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1989).
462. TUVE, supra note 1, at 158.
463. See id. at 157.
464. 17 F. Supp. 308, 309 (S.D. Ohio 1936) (per curiam).
465. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976).
466. See Walker, 17 F. Supp. at 309.
467. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 560–62 (1923).
468. See id. It thus disagreed with its prior decision in Muller, upholding protective
legislation of maximum working hours for women because they were different from men,
as women were physically weak and small, effected by maternity and menstruation, and
burdened by housework demands. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1908).
469. Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936).
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New York law in Morehead.470 Allen used this dicta as her guide,
distinguishing Ohio’s minimum wage standard from Adkins by its
non-vague description of a “fair wage” for reasonable value, and
thus, upheld the law.471 She adopted the moderate path of reconcili-
ation, rather than engaging with the constitutional claims on the
merits of gendered legislation.472 Four months later, a split Supreme
Court explicitly overruled Adkins on the merits in its decision in
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish by Chief Justice Hughes, finding it to be
a departure from true principles of employment and thus upholding
women’s minimum wage laws.473 One year later, Congress adopted
the Fair Labor Standards Act, extending the minimum wage to all
employees, shepherded by Roosevelt’s first female secretary of labor,
Frances Perkins.474 Allen’s decision thus foreshadowed the trend in
the law, and was consistent with her suffrage and labor background
generally in favor of protective legislation for women and workers.
Three years into her federal tenure, Judge Allen was tapped for
what would become one of the most important cases of her career,
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) case.475 Congress had recently
extended the three-judge court procedure to decisions seeking to
enjoin a federal statute.476 Allen was selected for the TVA case when
two of the other Sixth Circuit judges had personal conflicts with the
case, and a third had a serious illness.477 In the TVA case, nineteen
power plants sued the New Deal Tennessee Valley Authority that
sought to control the water of the Tennessee region with a dam for
unfair competition for its plan to sell the generated power to munici-
palities and impoverished people.478 The case was a slog of volumi-
nous exhibits, testimony, and attorneys, with filings designed to
delay and confuse.479 Allen with her hallmark judicial efficiency,
470. See id. at 618–21 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 631 (Stone, J., dis-
senting) (stating he would not make the differences between the statutes the sole basis
of decision).
471. See Walker, 17 F. Supp. at 309–11.
472. See id.
473. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937).
474. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1938); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 121–26 (1941) (upholding FLSA as valid exercise of Commerce Clause); Boisseau
& Thomas, supra note 16, at 237.
475. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 21 F. Supp. 947, 950 (E.D. Tenn.
1938), aff’d, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
476. See 22 U.S.C. § 2282 (repealed 1976). This law extended the pre-existing Section
2281, which required a three-judge court to enjoin a state law. Today, a three-judge court
is required only for apportionment of congressional districts. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
477. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 118.
478. 21 F. Supp. at 950.
479. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 119–21.
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streamlined the evidence and controlled the parties and the case.480
Her written decision wholeheartedly endorsed the power of the
federal government to create the TVA and regulate the navigable
waters.481 It was hailed as a victory for liberal governance and New
Deal legislation at a time when the U.S. Supreme Court had been
striking down much of President Roosevelt’s attempted economic
legislation.482 The Supreme Court upheld the TVA legislation, and the
case put Allen in the national spotlight.483 Decades later, however, the
TVA project became a target for modern liberals who challenged the
environmental consequences of the project for endangered species.484
Another Judge Allen opinion similarly upheld New Deal legis-
lation, although this time in dissent. In Filburn v. Helke, Allen dis-
sented from a decision enjoining a federal statute regulating and
penalizing the oversupply of wheat, finding the legislation to be a
valid exercise of the interstate commerce power.485 The majority
opinion, authored by district Judge Duffel, in another three-judge
trial court, focused on the equities and retroactivity of the case, and
the unfairness of significantly penalizing an Ohio farmer when he
had little warning of the change in law.486 “Judge Allen alone antici-
pated Filburn’s pivotal constitutional issue.”487 Allen relied heavily
on Supreme Court cases upholding New Deal agricultural programs,
and quoted extensively from Congressional findings to uphold the law
even as it regulated intrastate commercial activity.488 The Supreme
Court reversed, and upheld the law in the law school classic, Wickard
v. Filburn, accepting Allen’s view of the case.489 “Filburn is regarded
today as the high-water mark of the New Deal’s constitutional
revolution . . . perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity.”490
In the mid-1950s, Allen shepherded several important decisions
on race discrimination. The Supreme Court had decided Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954, finding racial segregation of public
480. See id. at 120.
481. See Tenn. Elec. Power Co., 21 F. Supp. at 960–61.
482. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 122.
483. See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 147 (1939).
484. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978) (enjoining construction
of dam to protect endangered species of fish); KENNETH M. MURCHISON, THE SNAIL
DARTER CASE: TVA VERSUS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 4–5 (2007).
485. 43 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (Allen, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
486. Id. at 1018–19.
487. Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation and Com-
merce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 69, 83 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d. ed. 2009).
488. See Filburn, 43 F. Supp. at 1020–23 (Allen, J., dissenting).
489. See 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
490. Chen, supra note 487, at 92 (internal quotations omitted).
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schools unconstitutional and in a subsequent decision ordered in-
tegration with “all deliberate speed.”491 In two cases, Judge Allen
ruled against school districts failing to follow the remedial dictate
of Brown to use all deliberate speed to end segregation in schools.492
Unlike some other courts and with some dissenting opinion, she also
issued injunctions ordering the conduct to stop.493 In a related deci-
sion, Judge Allen authored one of the Sixth Circuit’s most notable
cases: Detroit Housing Commission v. Lewis.494 In Detroit Housing, she
held that racial segregation in Detroit’s public housing was uncon-
stitutional, becoming the first case in the nation to so hold.495 De-
troit had maintained separate all-white and all-black housing, and
maintained separate eligibility lists resulting in vacancies in the
white housing but wait lists for black housing.496 Unlike Allen’s past
decision in Weaver that had earned her such criticism, this time Allen
took action to remedy the housing segregation on the basis of race.497
During her twenty-five years on the federal bench, Allen was
known for her intellect, clear writing, and work ethic.498 She became
Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit during her final term in 1958.499
Allen continued her interest in international issues, giving numer-
ous speeches and working on various transnational and global
initiatives, including a tour of a women’s prison in Spain, a series of
lectures in Mexico, and authoring the book, The Treaty as an Instru-
mentality of Legislation in 1952.500 This work increased her visibility
beyond the bench, giving Allen a national personality as the first
woman judge.501
VI. SHORTLISTED
Judge Allen’s visibility translated into putting her on the short
list for a possible nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court.502 Allen
491. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), further relief
ordered by 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
492. See Clemons v. Bd. of Educ. of Hillsboro, Ohio, 228 F.2d 853, 858 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied sub nom. Bd. of Educ. v. Clemons, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956); Booker v. Tennessee
Bd. of Educ., 240 F.2d 689, 694 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
493. See Clemons, 228 F.2d at 858; Booker, 240 F.2d at 694.
494. 226 F.2d 180, 181 (6th Cir. 1955).
495. Id. at 183.
496. Id. at 181 n.2.
497. See id. at 183.
498. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 153.
499. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary:
Three Way Pavers and the Exhilarating Change President Carter Wrought, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 281, 283 (1995).
500. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 130, 181; cf. Hon. Florence Allen, Women Lawyers of
the World Go Into Action, 37 WOMEN L.J. 13 (1951).
501. See Cook, supra note 6, at 22; cf. TUVE, supra note 1, at 194–95.
502. See Cook, supra note 6, at 19.
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became the first woman formally considered for the highest court in
the nation.503 She was considered for more than twelve vacancies by
four Presidents: Democratic Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Harry Truman, and Republican Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and
Herbert Hoover.504 Allen coveted and pursued the nomination through
self-candidacy and active supporters, but it remained out of reach.
She was realistic though, telling her supporters:
Do not block in the future too optimistically because there are
some things that will never happen in our lifetime. . . . when my
friends delightfully tell me that they hope to see me on the Su-
preme Bench of the U.S., I know . . . that will never happen to a
woman while I am living . . . .505
Allen’s name first came up for a possible candidacy on the
Supreme Court early in her federal career when the TVA case put
her name in the public eye.506 Rumors circulated in January 1938
that President Roosevelt was toying with the idea of appointing a
woman, lobbied by his wife, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt.507 In re-
sponse, Life magazine ran a story and prominent picture of Allen.508
President Roosevelt had appointed the first woman to the cabinet,
Frances Perkins as Labor Secretary, and there was hope that he
would be open to more appointments.509 Allen’s name would be pro-
posed to fill four vacancies that Roosevelt would ultimately fill with
Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, and William O.
Douglas.510 The timing of this first approach, however, during the
TVA case was both a gift and a curse; while the case elevated her
name to national status, her decision wholeheartedly endorsing FDR’s
New Deal made an appointment look like political payback, an
impression Roosevelt wanted to avoid.511
Allen and her supporters continued the campaign for her nomina-
tion, writing letters and lobbying politicians.512 Allen gave speeches,
and wrote a book, This Constitution of Ours, designed to show her
503. Kenney, supra note 121, at 211.
504. JEFFERSON & JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 16–17. There is also evidence that Allen
recommended for appointment by Republican President Calvin Coolidge as early as 1924.
Id. at 17.
505. Cook, supra note 6, at 19.
506. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 122.
507. See id. at 122–23.
508. Id. at 123.
509. Id. at 107.
510. See Cook, supra note 6, at 28.
511. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 122, 125.
512. See Cook, supra note 6, at 26–28.
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expertise in federal subject matter.513 The book was based on a series
of lectures Allen gave at Bryn Mawr during a leave from the appel-
late court.514 Allen thought that speaking about the Constitution
was not controversial, and thus could maintain her semblance of
judicial impartiality.515 The book was geared to the average public
citizen rather than legal scholars, and was an idealistic history
lesson more appropriate for high school students.516 It offered little
insights into her jurisprudence or ideals, and the publisher did little
to promote it.517 Instead, the publisher pressed for her for an autobi-
ography, something Allen was reluctant to do for many years.518
There are several theories as to why Allen was not appointed to
the Supreme Court. First, socially, the country may not have been
ready for a woman.519 “The public did not accept a woman’s seat on the
Court, and the politicians, the legal professionals and the justices
themselves did not perceive women lawyers as eligibles in the candi-
date pool.”520 Still, women’s groups continued to lobby heavily for
Allen’s appointment. India Edwards, director of the Women’s Division
of the Democratic National Committee, begged President Truman
to choose Allen.521 Truman told Edwards that he thought it would be
a good idea to have a woman Supreme Court Justice, especially one of
Allen’s reputation and capability.522 However, he wanted to consult
Supreme Court Justice Fred Vinson first about “how he and the other
Justices would feel about having a woman in their group.”523 Vinson
reported that he and his colleagues “would not be willingly to have
a woman as a Justice[,]” as “[s]he would make it difficult for them
to meet informally with robes, and perhaps shoes, off, shirt collars
unbuttoned.”524 Edwards also thought that the old line about there
being no women’s restroom also added into their decision.525
Allen’s failed nomination may have also been because she was
not liberal enough to get the Democratic nomination. Her decisions as
well as her presentation were that of a moderate. Roosevelt wanted
513. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 145–46 (citing FLORENCE E. ALLEN, THIS CONSTITUTION
OF OURS (1940)).
514. See id.
515. See id. at 145.
516. See id. at 149.
517. See id. at 148–49.
518. See id. at 150–51.
519. Cook, supra note 55, at 314.
520. Id. at 315.
521. See TUVE, supra note 1, at 163–64.
522. Id. at 164 (citing INDIA EDWARDS, PULLING NO PUNCHES: MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN
IN POLITICS 171 (1977)).
523. Id.
524. EDWARDS, supra note 522, at 171–72.
525. Id. at 172.
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a “pronounced liberal” and party stalwart.526 Allen’s quiet progres-
sivism, and sometimes moderation, as well as her public speeches
on safe topics did not fit this standard. Allen described herself as a
“liberal-conservative,” which Time magazine called “middle-of-the-
roadish.”527 Her great liberal causes of women, suffrage, and peace
were “passé” and old fashioned and did not appeal to the modern
liberals or judicial concerns.528 Thus, there was no political advan-
tage to be gained by nominating Allen.529
Several other suggestions have been made for why Allen did not
receive the nomination. Some say that she was less qualified for the
position than those appointed who had Ivy League credentials, busi-
ness practice, and top political experience.530 These elite biases would
be significant barriers to women’s judicial appointment in the dec-
ades to come as these were the areas that most excluded women,
whereas state practice, small firms, and other practice areas were
devalued.531 Allen, however, seems qualified even by these highbrow
standards, given her education at Chicago and NYU, prosecutorial
experience, and decades of judicial experience on matters of consti-
tutional and patent import. Other critiques at the time mentioned
her support for another federal judge who challenged the income
taxation of judges, her “spinster” status, and that she had a bad
reversal record, even though that was not true.532
Being “shortlisted” was another historic accomplishment for
Allen, even though she would never receive the nomination. It paved
the way for women nominees, opening up the judicial pipeline for
women, however narrow and leaky.533 Nine more women were
formally shortlisted for the Supreme Court nomination over the
next forty years.534 But it would be almost fifty years until a woman
would be appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1981, President
Ronald Reagan nominated Arizona state judge, Sandra Day O’Connor
to be the first woman Justice.535 Reagan, faced with a dramatic
political shift and gender gap of women voting Democrat in large
numbers, pledged during the campaign to appoint the first woman
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justice.536 O’Connor was hailed as the perfect first woman on the
Court because she was able to get along with the all-male institu-
tion without causing problems.537 She didn’t challenge the status
quo, was moderate in decorum and ideology, conversationally put her
male colleagues at ease, hosted luncheons, and organized aerobics
in the Court basement.538 In contrast to the next woman appointed
to the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, O’Connor did not make
waves or challenge legal and social norms, and thus seemed to ease
the transition, at least for the men. The feisty Ginsburg arrived with
her subversive ideology of gender equality, fierce determination for
women’s rights, and demand for a better office on a separate floor
apart from the other Justices.539
CONCLUSION: THE GAVEL’S GLASS CEILING
Despite Allen’s deliberate efforts to be a role model and open up
the judiciary and public office for women, she instead became a
token.540 Acutely aware of her role as an historic first, Allen wrote
articles and spoke to many women’s and business associations en-
couraging women to enter the profession.541 Allen was not one “to
pull up the ladder behind her” but rather was one personally com-
mitted to bringing more women up the ranks with her.542
However, Allen’s desired legacy for women in the law would be
muted and delayed. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg remarked,
“[a]fter Allen’s retirement in 1959, the appellate bench would remain
entirely male until 1968.”543 No other woman would be appointed as
a federal appellate judge until thirty-four years after Allen, when
Shirley Hufstedler was selected for the Ninth Circuit in 1968.544 No
other woman was appointed to the Sixth Circuit for another forty-
five years, until Cornelia Kennedy was appointed in 1979.545 A woman
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would not be appointed to the federal district court in Ohio until
1980, when Ann Aldrich (another six-foot-tall NYU Law graduate)
was appointed to the Northern District in Cleveland.546 A big change
on the federal courts came when President Jimmy Carter made
gender and racial diversification of the federal courts a priority and
created judicial merit task forces, resulting in the appointment of
forty women to the federal courts.547 At the state level, it would be
sixty years after Florence Allen until another woman served on the
Ohio Supreme Court when Blanche Krupansky was temporarily
appointed in 1981, and Alice Robie Resnick was elected in 1989.548
Florence Allen broke the judicial glass ceiling that, eventually,
led to more women on the courts. However, one hundred years after
Allen first took the bench, only thirty-five percent of judges in the
state and federal courts are women.549 There are some aberrations,
as the Ohio Supreme Court in 2019 had a majority of women, and
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas in Akron, Ohio, is all
female.550 Yet overall, women have not achieved more than minority
status on the judiciary. There is a recognized “gavel gap” between
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the percentage of women on the bench and the percentage of women
in the general population and women entering law schools.551
Women’s proportional representation on the courts is important
for political legitimacy and accountability in reflecting the populace
controlled by the laws decided there.552 Women judges may also see
issues differently, informed by their different life experiences better
reflecting the case situation, as Justice Sonya Sotomayor recognized
in commenting that she viewed cases from the perspective of a “wise
Latina woman.”553 Other studies have suggested that women jurists
build consensus on appellate panels and empathize with plaintiffs
in sexual harassment, employment, immigration, death penalty,
and obscenity cases, bringing a balance to a skewed system.554 At
the end of the day, more than tokenism then is needed in diversify-
ing the bench. One woman was not simply enough to significantly
alter the male-centric law or the profession. Allen’s own success
depended upon assimilation, not contradiction. So how many women
judges will it take—when will there be enough women on the judi-
ciary? Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s answer was, “when there are
nine.”555 Judge Florence Allen opened the gate, and one hundred
years later, there is a still a judicial path waiting for other women
to follow.
551. The Gavel Gap, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://gavelgap.org [https://perma.cc/9HES
-89PD].
552. See SALLY KENNEY, GENDER & JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY REALLY
MATTER xii (2012).
553. Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, Judge Mario G. Olmos Memorial
Lecture at Univ. Cal. Berkeley Law School (2001), in 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92
(2002).
554. See Boyd & Epstein, supra note 28; Boyd et al., supra note 29, at 406 (finding the
probability of a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination decreases when
the judge is male); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 208 (finding female immigration
judges granted asylum at a rate of 53%, while male judges granted asylum at a rate of
37.3%); Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 29, at 750 (finding female judges on state su-
preme courts vote more liberally than male judges in death penalty and obscenity cases
and increase likelihood that male judge will adopt the liberal position). But see Dixon, supra
note 30, at 313 (finding little evidence that women judges vote differently than men).
555. When Will There Be Enough Women on the Supreme Court? Justice Ginsburg
Answers That Question, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour
/show/justice-ginsburg-enough-women-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/6PM2-RD8F].
